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3I.  INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant theoretical advancements in the 
legal academy is the recognition that law is not the only method of 
social regulation.  Other methods of social control include social 
norms and architecture.1  This has led researchers in a variety of 
disciplines to document how the architecture of information 
technologies or code affects our online experiences and activities.2
The term “code” refers to the hardware and software components of 
information technologies.  This has also led to policymakers to 
consider code-based as well as legal solutions to societal problems.3
The problems addressed include preventing crime,4 fostering 
competition,5 limiting free speech,6 protecting privacy,7 increasing 
1 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 95 (1999) 
(noting the role of architecture and social norms).  Among the most influential 
works on social norms are Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms:  Internalization, 
Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000); ROBERT ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, 
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW 
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
2 See Paul DiMaggio et al., Social Implications of the Internet, 27 ANN. REV. OF 
SOC. 307 (2001) (discussing the need for sociologists to attend to the architecture 
of information technologies); CARL L. SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION 
RULES (1998) (discussing how the architecture of information technologies can 
affect informational economics); François Bar, The Construction of Marketplace 
Architecture, in TRACKING A TRANSFORMATION:  E-COMMERCE AND THE TERMS 
OF COMPETITION IN INDUSTRIES (2001) (discussing how consumer choice and 
market outcomes can be affected by the architecture of information technologies); 
Andrew J. Flannigan et al., The Technical Code of the Internet/World Wide Web, 
17 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 409 (2000) (discussing the role of the 
architecture of information technologies for communication scholars).
3
 Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); 
TIMOTHY D. CROWE, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (2d 
ed. 2000).
4
 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 
(2001).
5
 The open access movement is based upon the principle that the architecture can 
support competition as well as providing a platform to support innovative 
applications.  Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 925 (2001).
6
 This Article discusses the use of architectural solutions for addressing the 
problem of minors viewing inappropriate content.  A number of commentators 
have addressed this issue.  Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech On 
The Internet:  A Legal And Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1999); 
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997).  
See also David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited 
4security,8 ensuring fair use in copyright,9 and revitalizing democratic 
discourse.10
In choosing architectural solutions, policymakers have had to 
rely on their own insights and experiences.  There is no 
comprehensive analysis of the various methods government can use 
to reshape code.  This article addresses this lacuna by building upon 
previous work by Reidenberg and others in discussing how 
government can influence the development of code.11  The resulting 
Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325 (2001) (discussing approaches to limit 
unsolicited bulk email); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 182-89 (2001) (proposing 
the redesign of web sites to incorporate links of different viewpoints to provide 
exposure to differing viewpoints).
7
 An example of an architectural solution for privacy is the Preferences for Privacy 
Project (P3P).  See William McGeveran, Programmed Privacy Promises:  P3P and 
Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1813 (2001) (arguing for P3P as a solution 
to privacy problems.  See also Malla Pollack, Opt-In Government:  Using the 
Internet to Empower Choice—Privacy Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 653 
(2001) (proposing the creation of a government search engine that only links to 
web sites that protect a user’s privacy); Shawn H. Helms, Translating Privacy 
Values With Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 288 (2001) (arguing the 
government, privacy advocacy groups, and users should support the adoption of 
privacy enhancing technologies).
8
 President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace¸ available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/ (Sep. 2002) 
(suggesting a number of architectural solutions for improving security).
9
 Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH 41 (2001) (providing an example of an 
architectural solution to allow fair use in digital based intellectual property).  The 
media industry has been very vocal in supporting architectural solutions to 
protection their intellectual property.  Amy Harmon, Hearings on Digital Movies 
and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/03/01/technology/01DIGI.html.  See also, Michael J. Madison, Complexity 
and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125 (2000) (using 
the architectural metaphor to examine copyright law).
10 See ANTHONY G. WILHELM, DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 44-47 (2000); 
Cathy Bryan et al., Electronic Democracy and the Civic Networking Movement in 
Context, in CYBERDEMOCRACY 1 (Roza Tsagarousianou et al. eds., 1998).
11
 Reidenberg explicitly addresses how public policy can change code.  Joel 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 588-92 (1998).  See also STUART 
BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE (2001) (providing a broad framework for 
regulating cyberspace).  See generally David M. Hart, U.S. Technology Policy:  
New Tools for New Times, NIRA REV., (1998), available at 
http://www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/98summer/hart.html (providing a good 
summary of the various methods the government can use to shape the development
of technologies); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GOVERNMENT 
5categorization defines various methods policymakers can use, while 
also providing an analyzing the possibilities and limitations of each 
approach.  The resulting framework allows policymakers to 
encourage and proactively shape the development of code to meet a 
variety of societal concerns, such as privacy, security, and 
competition through the use of government’s regulatory and fiscal 
powers.
While, this Article may seem unnecessary given the current 
rhetoric that government must keeps its hands off the internet, U.S. 
Department of Commerce General Counsel Andrew Pincus argues 
that “the needs and dynamics of the marketplace, and not 
governments, must guide standard development and implementation 
activities.  Governments should refrain from issuing technical 
regulations and instead should rely, to the maximum extent possible, 
on the private sector to self-regulate.”12  The reality is that 
government has, is, and will be heavily involved in shaping the 
development of code.  For example, consider recent legislation on 
unsolicited e-mail and regulations requiring cell phone number 
portability.13  In addition to the proposals mentioned above, the 
government is also involved in shaping the development of code for 
reasons of antitrust,14 national security,15 protection of intellectual 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE INNOVATION PROCESS (1978) (discussing various methods 
for government to shape technologies).
12
 Andre Pincus, General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, The Role of 
Standards in Growth of the Global Electronic Commerce, Oct. 28, 1999, available 
at http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/ecom1028.html.
13
 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-127 (2004); Telephone Number Portability, CC Docket No. 
95-116, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 03-284 (Nov. 10, 2003).
14
 For example, in the Microsoft antitrust trial the government is attempting to 
restrain Microsoft from using its code for illegal competitive advantages.  
Microsoft has "commingled" the code of its Internet Explorer browser and the 
Windows operating system to protect its monopoly power in violation of antitrust 
laws.  While the remedy is still unclear, the government is influencing the design 
of code for the benefit of competition and ultimately consumers.  The illegal 
commingling was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.  See Appeals court rejects Microsoft, government requests, ZDNET, 
Aug. 2, 2001, available at http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/ 
0,11011,2801117,00.html.  See also Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once 
Shame on You – Fool Us Twice Shame On Us:  What We Can Learn From the 
Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79 
WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 195 (2001) (noting how government modified code for 
competition during the privatization of the backbone network).
6property rights,16 accessibility,17 safety,18 and the labeling content.19
Since government regulation generally seeks to prevent harm and 
15
 For national security reasons, the government has restricted the sale of code.  See 
Steven B. Winters & John A. Blomgren, How the US Government Controls 
Technology, 19 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2002).  The U.S. Government 
restricted the export of code containing strong encryption until 2000.  This law led 
to companies, such as Netscape, having to market a weaker encryption version of 
their browser for download outside of the United States.  In January 2000, a new 
encryption policy allowed the export of strong encryption in programs to most of 
the world.  David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on 
Encryption Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/01/biztech/articles/13export.html.  
Relatedly, the government eased export restrictions on the fastest computers.  John 
Markoff, White House Eases Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/technology/11EXPO.html.  Despite the 
terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government is not planning to require "backdoors" that 
would allow government access to encrypted communications.  Declan 
McCullagh, Senator Backs Off Backdoors, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001, available 
at http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47635,00.html.
16
 To protect intellectual property rights, the government uses both civil and 
criminal penalties.  The government effectively shut down the music-trading 
program Napster for copyright violations.  John Borland, Database "upgrades" 
keep Napster down, CNET NEWS.COM, July 6, 2001, available at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6443598.html.  The government attempted 
prosecuting a programmer who wrote a program that circumvented Adobe's E-
book format.  Amy Harmon & Jennifer Lee, Arrest Raises Stakes in Battle Over 
Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001; Roger Parloff, Free Dmitry? Spare Me:  
Why the FBI Was Right to Arrest the Internet's Latest Martyr, INSIDE.COM, Aug. 
01, 2001, available at http://www.inside.com/product/Product.asp?pf_ 
id=%7BE8EECFA3-CBD1-447E-952C-CC16283D266C%7D (providing an 
excellent review of the facts and circumstances around Dmitry Sklyarov's arrest).
17
 The government regulates the design of code for accessibility as a form of public 
welfare.  For example, the government has required television manufacturers to 
incorporate closed captioning for the hearing impaired.  Closed Caption Decoder 
Requirements for Television Receivers, 47 C.F.R. § 15.119 (2002); The FCC page 
on closed captioning is at http://www.fcc.gov/cib/dro/caption.html.  Similarly, 
regulations require that federal agencies must become disability friendly.  This has 
created demand for code that allows the development of accessible web sites.  
Carrie Johnson, A More Accessible Web, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2000, at E01.
18
 The FAA and the FDA regulate the development of code for the safety of 
society.  See Leslie A. (Schad) Johnson, DO-178B, Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, CROSSTALK, Oct. 1998, available 
at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/1998/oct/schad.asp (focusing on DO-17B 
rules); George Romanski, The Challenges of Software Certification, CROSSTALK, 
Sep. 2001, available at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2001/sep/romanski.asp
(discussing how to ensure safe air transportation while using computer controlled 
systems).  Similarly, the FDA also regulates medical device software for the 
benefit of public safety.  These regulations require developers to use accepted 
software engineering practices during the development process to ensure the 
7promote benefits such as innovation, regulating with code is 
analogous to the architectural regulation found in buildings and 
cities,20 transportation,21 the environment,22and biotechnology.23
Discussed herein are various measures government can use to 
shape the development of code.  For each measure, we identify and 
discuss regulatory and technological issues that affect its 
effectiveness.  The result is a more informed approach in weighing 
the alterative approaches to shaping code.  We do not attempt to 
determine the comparative efficiency of different approaches to 
shaping code, because, in part, that analysis is a factually laden 
inquiry depending on the specific characteristics and issues related to 
the particular type of code in question.  Generally, government 
becomes involved when societal concerns are not being addressed in 
the marketplace and often uses a combination of these approaches to 
shape code.
This article contributes to three different literatures.  First, it 
provides the regulatory literature with a work that is tailored to 
information technologies.  It does this by largely building upon 
Justice Breyer’s seminal work on regulatory theory.24  The result is a 
framework that provides a comprehensive approach for regulating 
the Internet.  Second, this article contributes to the emerging 
software will operate properly.  Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 820 
(1999); FDA, Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software 
Contained in Medical Devices, available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/57.html 
(May 29, 1998); John K. Suzuki, Documenting the Software Validation of 
Computer-Controlled Devices and Manufacturing Processes:  A Guide for Small 
Manufacturers, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY MAG., (Jan. 1996), 
available at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/96/01/023.html (providing 
an overview of the process).
19
.  The government has required television manufacturers to incorporate the "V-
chip" which allows parents to block inappropriate television programs.  
Requirement for Manufacture of Televisions that Block Programs, 47 U.S.C. § 
303(x) (2001); The FCC page on the V-Chip is at http://www.fcc.gov/
vchip/legislation.html.  Similarly, legislation requires public libraries funded by 
federal funds to install software to block obscene or pornographic images.  See
United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
20
 This literature encompasses urban planning through zoning and architecture 
through building codes.  See JOHN LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN PLANNING
(1999); INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (2000).
21 ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 155-56 (1986).
22 PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(1994).
23 MICHAEL J. MALINOWSKI, BIOTECHNOLOGY:  LAW, BUSINESS, AND
REGULATION (1999).
24 STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
8literature on using code as a regulatory mechanism.  With this 
approach, code is used to modify or limit behavior, instead of relying 
upon users to limit their behavior because of legal sanctions.  In the 
process of developing our framework, we highlight numerous ways 
in which code is or can be used by government as a regulatory 
mechanism.  Third, this article contributes to the communications 
literature by highlighting how government shapes the medium of 
cyberspace. While communications scholars have focused on how 
code is developed, little attention has been focused on the myriad of 
ways government has traditionally shaped communications 
technologies to address societal concerns. 25
This Article is organized in four parts.  Part II discusses how 
government can use its regulatory power to shape code; specifically, 
prohibitions on code, using standards or market-based incentives, 
modifying liability, and requiring disclosure.  We also argue that 
government needs to develop a comprehensive regulatory strategy 
for code.  Part III discusses fiscal measures government can utilize, 
including government funding of research and development, the use 
of the government’s procurement power, tax expenditures, and 
funding of education and training.  In Part IV, we analyze how 
government can shape code through intellectual property rights.  We 
discuss this in a general sense and then focus on compulsory 
licensing and technology transfer issues. 
II.  SHAPING CODE THROUGH REGULATORY METHODS
It is well established that government can and should shape 
code with its regulatory power.26  This section provides a framework 
25
 Much of the communication literature focuses on how corporations shape the 
medium.  VINCENT MOSCO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNICATION:  
RETHINKING AND RENEWAL (1996); Robert McChesney, The Political Economy of 
Global Communication, in CAPITALISM AND THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (Robert 
McChesney et al. eds., 1998).  But newer work recognizes other institutions, such 
as the open source movement, in the development of communication technologies.  
Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2004).
26
 Considerable support has amassed for the principle that government has a role in 
regulating the Internet.  LESSIG, supra note 1, at 201-02; Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Cyberspace Self-Governance:  A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000); Reidenberg, supra note 11; Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. 
Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You – Fool Us Twice Shame On Us:  What We Can 
Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain 
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, 
Neither Bottom-Up Nor Top-Down:  A Tacit Public Private Cooperative Solution 
9of various regulatory tools and analyzes how they may be used to 
shape code.  We do not attempt to formulate a simplistic model for 
how government should shape code.  Instead, we attempt to provide 
a framework to highlight some of the critical issues that must be 
addressed when using any specific regulatory approach.  This 
approach is preferable to a simplistic formulistic approach that is 
bound to fail due to numerous and varied factors prevalent in any 
attempted government regulation.27
Government may employ its regulatory power in five 
different ways to influence the development of code; all of which 
regulate harmful technology.  Table 1, below, lists a brief synopsis of 








Ban Harm is unacceptable at 
any level
Digital Millennium 









Stick Require the use of 
technologies to reduce 
the harm








Carrot Limit the harm by 
making it more costly 
(taxes) or by limiting its 
quantity (property rights)
Creation of property, 
e.g., domain names 
and IP addresses
for Internet Regulation (forthcoming); Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the 
State Action Debate:  The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to 
“Private Regulation”, 71 COLO. L. REV. 1263 (2000); Henry H. Peritt, Towards a 
Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001); 
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:  
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).  
Even libertarians agree that the government may have a role in regulating the 
Internet.  See David Post, What Larry Doesn't Get:  Code, Law, and Liberty in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000).  
27 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 4-11 (1982)
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Table 1.  Regulatory methods for addressing harms
A. Prohibiting Code
Unlike regulation, which allows a certain level of a 
technology or activity, a prohibition holds there is no acceptable 
level within society.28  Prohibited technologies and activities can 
involve national security, public safety, and environmental 
concerns,29 e.g., the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
attempted to prohibit the transmission of indecent and obscene 
material to minors.30  In this section, we first present the chief 
criticisms of the government’s use of prohibition as a regulatory 
mechanism.  The remainder of the section addresses these criticisms 
and shows how prohibitions can shape code. 
28
 We are focusing on prohibitions that actively shape code and not prohibitions 
that are focused on competition.  In telecommunications, the government has long 
prohibited certain firms from engaging in certain activities to foster competition.  
For example, not allowing the baby Bells into the long distance market until they 
allow for competition in the local market.  See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the 
Giant:  How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, 
and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing how competitive 
restrictions on AT&T shaped code).
29
 For example, banning of predatory fish, such as the snakehead fish.  Here the 
government is saying, that it is in the interest of society that people do not have 
access to these fish.  The potential costs to society are too great.  See Anita Huslin, 
At Last, U.S. Hopes, Snakehead is History, WASH POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at B4 
(discussing a forthcoming ban on snakehead fish).
30
 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1997).
11
The use of government prohibition has three major criticisms.  
First, since a prohibition does not allow for potentially beneficial 
uses, it is not an economically efficient means of regulation because 
its cost is much higher than its benefit.31  Critics suggest that a less 
costly approach would be to use regulation with standards or require 
the use of product warnings.  A second criticism, high cost, arises 
because the easy reproduction and transmission of code in a software 
format makes enforcement difficult.  As an example, in the DeCSS 
case, members of the hacker community distributed a program that 
deciphered the encryption used to protect DVDs.32  In a short time, 
this code spread across the world and is still readily available despite 
the efforts of the movie industry to stifle its distribution.  The final 
criticism results from the negative effect of prohibition on 
innovation.  By not allowing the development or sale of a 
technology, the government closes off a path for future research and 
development.  This is especially pertinent to emerging areas of 
technological development and has been used widely in the recent 
debate over the use of stem cells.  Proponents of stem cell research 
argue that limiting research could stifle the development of 
lifesaving medical breakthroughs.33
Despite these criticisms, prohibitions can be an efficient 
means of regulation.  A prohibition is efficient when the cost of no 
prohibition to society greatly outweighs the needs of some citizens.34
In these cases, society cannot permit the needs of a select few to 
outweigh those of the entire society.35  Because regulations serve to 
provide an acceptable level of a technology or activity within 
society, when no such a balance is acceptable, prohibition becomes 
necessary.  For example, the standard for banning a product by the 
31
 James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64 
(1970).
32
 David M. Ewalt, DeCSS Case Could Change Your IT Shop, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, July 16, 2001, available at http://www.informationweek.
com/story/IWK20010711S0010.
33
 Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Stem Cells: A Primer, 
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 
2002).
34
 The cost here is not purely economic cost, but social cost.  There are many 
prohibitions based on moral grounds, such as human cloning. Many technologies 
associated with reproduction are prohibited or heavily regulated, for example stem 
cell research and cloning.  See Vernon J. Ehlers, The Case Against Human 
Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 523 (1999).
35 See DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 44 (1990) (arguing that product bans are 
useful when the social costs clearly exceeds the social benefits).
12
Consumer Product Safety Commission is if “no feasible consumer 
product safety standard . . . would adequately protect the public from 
the unreasonable risk of injury.”36  Society has banned each of the 
following technologies: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),37
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),38 and, without suggesting an 
equivalence amongst these examples, anti-circumvention code.39
A prohibition’s enforcement costs are generally much lower 
than other regulatory actions.  It is much simpler to enforce a ban on 
all uses of a technology rather than limiting a single product or 
activity.  Since it is much more difficult to ensure a product is only 
being used or sold for its “permitted” use, once government allows 
such use, enforcement costs rise.  Availability of substitutes is 
another factor that can lower the cost of enforcement.  Substitutes 
that impose lower social costs can reduce demand for the prohibited 
product, thus easing enforcement of the prohibition.  However, the 
lack of substitutes and continuing high demand for the prohibited 
product risk the creation of an illegal market.  Looking at the 
ongoing drug war, the lack of substitutes for narcotics and the high 
demand has led to the formation of a vast illegal market.  Thus, our 
analysis suggests that prohibitions are most efficient when enforced 
broadly across society and when users have access to substitute 
products.
Prohibitions on code can lead to high enforcement costs 
because of the ease of reproduction and transmission of code.  
Nonetheless, prohibitions on code are not useless.  Rather, 
prohibition can still drastically limit the use of a technology through 
its effect on law-abiding individuals and firms.  While there may be 
elements of society that bypass the prohibition, prohibitions can 
substantially reduce the social costs of undesired technology.  This is 
true of intellectual property rights, which the government has 
protected by making it illegal to develop anti-circumvention code.40
As a result, there are no legitimate firms selling such code.41  While 
36
 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1976).  See also Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of 
Cancer Risks in Consumer Products, 67 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1981) (examining the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s regulation of carcinogens).
37
 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (e).
38
 Consumer Products Safety Commission, Regulations for Self-Pressurized 
Consumer Products Containing Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 C.F.R. § 1401.
39
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2001).
40 Id.
41
 In the earlier days of personal computing, a popular genre was copy programs 
that circumvented copy protection.  For example, LockSmith was a commercially 
available program that allowed its users to copy programs that were copy 
13
this has not stopped the development of anti-circumvention code, the 
prohibition has severely limited distribution of this code out of 
concern for the potential liability exposure.42  Similarly, prohibiting 
unsolicited email is not expected to solve the problem, but rather 
provide another means of reducing unsolicited email.43
We find it difficult to apply enforcement cost analysis to the 
government’s restriction on the export of encryption technology.  
While the government historically restricted the export of encryption 
technology,44 it has recently relaxed its export regulations and 
allowed the export of encryption technology.45  The major exception 
to this policy is the prohibition against exports to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.46  Enforcement costs increase 
both because this prohibition is a limited one,47 and because 
prohibited encryption technologies are readily available.  We see an 
example of this is in export regulations which allow firms to publicly 
post their code on the web for download.  According to the 
regulations, this is not considered a knowing export and is thus 
permissible, even though anyone, including people in the prohibited 
countries, can download the code.48  Additionally, the lack of 
substitutes drives up enforcement costs.  In fact, there are no 
substitutes or alternatives to alleviate the social costs arising from 
encryption technology which allow terrorists and criminal 
protected.  This was a legitimate need, as many software publishers would not 
provide a backup or replacement copy of the software if the disk became 
unreadable. See Donald W. Larson, User Land Discussion Archive, Tales of Woz's 
Genius, (July 7, 2000), available at http://static.userland.com/ 
userLandDiscussArchive/msg018908.html.
42
 This can be seen in the efforts to place alternative programs and operating 
systems on Microsoft’s Xbox gaming console.  While individuals have
circumvented the Xbox’s security systems, this code has not been publicly 
distributed.  See David Becker, MIT Student Hacks into Xbox, CNET NEWS.COM, 
(June 3, 2002), available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-931296.html; David 
Becker, “Mod Chip” for Hacking Xbox Discontinued, CNET NEWS.COM, (June 26, 
2002), available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-939591.html. 
43
 Jonathan Krim, Anti-Spam Act Signed But Some Are Skeptical, WASH POST, 
Dec. 17, 2003, at A18.
44
 Peter H. Lewis, Privacy For Computers? Clinton Sets the Stage For a Debate on 
Data Encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 11, 1995, at D7.
45 See supra note 15.  
46
 Revisions and Clarifications to Encryption Controls in the Export 
Administration Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 38, 855 (June 6, 2002).
47
 For example, this provision is found in the license of the Netscape browser.  
Netscape, Netscape Browser Distribution Program License Agreement, available 
at http://wp.netscape.com/bisdev/distribution/start.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2002).
48
 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 15.740.13(e)(6).
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organizations to conceal their communications.49  The government
did attempt to solve this problem with the Clipper chip, but the effort 
failed.50  All of the aforementioned factors combine to create high 
enforcement costs, suggesting that current policy is not practical.51
Prohibitions can also provoke innovation and provide an 
impetus for research and development.52  Conversely, prohibiting 
technologies in emerging industries can reduce innovation.53
Research has shown that prohibitions have varying effects upon the 
development of substitutes by the existing “insider” firms within an 
industry.  However, prohibitions can lead to new “outsider” firms 
developing technologically innovative substitutes.54  One method of 
minimizing the impact of prohibitions upon innovation and 
encouraging the creation of substitutes is a gradual phasing out of the 
technology.  The government implemented just such a policy by 
phasing out the production of CFCs thereby allowing the 
development of alternatives materials.55
An example of a code-based prohibition that could have 
provoked technological change is the now unconstitutional part of 
the CDA, which banned the transmission of indecent content to 
minors over the Internet.  Without challenging the holding, based 
49
 While lesser strength encryption products are not prohibited, they are not 
adequate substitutes for terrorist or criminal organizations.  This is because the 
government is able to decrypt communications protected by these weaker products.  
See Daniel Verton, DOD:  Encryption Export Troubling, FED. COMPUTER WK., 
(July 12, 1999).
50
 The Clipper chip was an encryption technology that left a “back door” for the 
government to eavesdrop on communications.  However, it met with opposition 
and was never adopted.  See LAURA J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN
CYBERSPACE:  THE ONLINE PROTESTS OVER LOTUS MARKETPLACE AND THE 
CLIPPER CHIP (1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: 
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 
752-59 (1995).
51
 While this policy is ineffectual from the standpoint of enforcement costs, there 
are other reasons why it may still be necessary.  In this case, this policy is part of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seeks to regulate dual-use technologies.  See 
Revisions and Clarifications to Encryption Controls in the Export Administration 
Regulations, supra note 46.
52
 Nicholas Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 
9 HARV. ENVIRON. L. REV. 419 (1985).
53 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS:  A 
USER’S GUIDE 100 (1995). 
54
 Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention and Environmental 
Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38-39 (1997) (discussing Ashford’s 
research).
55 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 53, at 99-100.
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correctly on the First Amendment, this prohibition could have 
accelerated the development of verification technologies to identify 
minors and filtering programs that ensure minors do not access 
indecent content.  These technologies would have arisen as a 
byproduct of the large amount of indecent content accessible over the 
Internet.56  Web sites would have supported technologies that 
allowed them to continue to provide indecent material.  Minors, with 
limited economic resources, would have found it difficult to find the 
same material using alternate channels.  This illustrates how the 
CDA could have used society-wide prohibition to shape the 
development of code.  
B. Setting Standards:  The Command and Control Approach
Government can shape the development of code by using 
standards mandating the technological requirements for code.  This 
direct approach has traditionally been known as the command and 
control approach, with the government acting as both the enforcer 
and the standard-setter.  This approach is often contrasted with the 
use of market-based incentives, discussed in the following section.57
The government shapes three types of standards.  The first category 
includes standards that promote transactions, interconnection, and 
interoperability.58  Many code-based standards are of this type.  
Examples of these include standards for wireless communication, 
56
 A new version of the CDA is now attempting to pass constitutional muster.  
Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) 
(requiring sites that are harmful to minors to use an age verification barrier).  It is 
being challenged.  American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F. 3d 162 (3rd Cir.
2000).  See http://www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/ (providing further supporting 
documents).
57 See infra Part II.C.
58
 These types of standards are known as process standards.  Process standards 
facilitate transactions, such as standards for bills of lading.  See Office of 
Technology Assessment, supra note 59, at 100.  An important code-based process 
standard is for interconnection.  Government can use interconnection standards for 
a number of purposes including facilitating competition.  See Kesan & Shah, supra 
note 26, at 205 (discussing interconnection standards for the competition in 
telecommunications); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard-setting, and 
Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (discussing when government should 
regulate by mandating open, interoperable standards).  Interconnection can even 
aid law enforcement.  For example, the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act requires telecommunication firms to ensure their infrastructure 
allows for wiretapping by law enforcement.  Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
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such as 802.11b, or for commerce, such as Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL).  The second category includes product standards, which 
provide information about a product’s characteristics.59  The  U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses just such a standard in its 
labeling system for food.60  A third type of standard protects against 
societal hazards or problems.61  These safety-oriented standards are 
commonly used in environmental and transportation regulation.  In 
this section we first discuss how technologically forward-looking the 
government should be in its regulatory efforts.  Next, we discuss the 
different methods government can use in mandating standards.
1. Technology-Forcing
Technology forcing, an important issue in standard-setting, 
refers to regulatory efforts that direct the development of 
technologies along specific paths.62  The standards force firms to 
either innovate or diffuse technologies.  In the case of innovation, the 
government attempts to force the creation of new technologies.  
When using diffusion, the government forces firms to incorporate 
59
 Product standards contain information on the characteristics of the products.  
This information allows for product identification, interoperability, and quality 
control.  See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GLOBAL 
STANDARDS:  BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 99 (1992).  Government 
mandated product standards are discussed in more detail in a later section on the 
disclosure of code’s characteristics.  See infra Part II.E.
60 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY 
BOOK (1998). 
61
 An example of a control standard is the quality requirements for automobile 
tires.  See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, New Pneumatic Tires --
Passenger Cars manufactured after 1948, Part 571, Standard No. 109 (requiring 
every tire to have information encoded on the sidewall specifying temperature, 
speed, load, traction, and tread-life ratings).  An example of a control standard for 
code is the requirement for televisions to incorporate closed captioning.  Television 
Decoder Circuitry Act, Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (codified at 47 U. S. C. 
§ 303 (u), § 330 (b) (1990)) (regarding closed captioning); Sy Dubow, The 
Television Decoder Circuitry Act—TV for All, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 609 (1991).  
Another example is the FCC’s regulation of radio frequency devices.  Marketing of 
Radio-Frequency Devices, 47 C.F.R. § 2.801 (2001).  See also Christopher 
Smallwood, FCC Regulation of Computers, COMPUTER LAW, (Mar. 1992), at 25.  
Control standards may also be used during the production of code.  For example, 
the FAA and the FDA both use control standards to ensure the development 
process for code meets strict quality assurance guidelines.  See supra note 18.
62
 Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture:  The Case of 
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, n. 18 (1987) (defining technology-
forcing). 
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existing technologies into their products.  This use of technology-
forcing regulation has varied by industry.  Early automobile 
regulation used a significant amount of technology-forcing 
regulation while building code regulations contain little technology-
forcing aspects.63
 The first part of this section discusses and addresses 
criticisms of government’s use of technology-forcing regulation to 
shape the development of code.  The second part discusses code-
based technology-forcing regulation and analyzes the 
Communications Decency Act from a technology-forcing 
perspective, providing insight into the failure of the CDA from a 
legal and technological standpoint.
In using technology-forcing regulation, a regulator must 
consider a number of criticisms.64  First, why is government directing 
the development of technologies in specific areas?  Critics argue this 
approach is ineffective, and the government can use other methods, 
such as market incentives, to shape technologies.  Second, how is 
government able to accurately set technology-forcing regulations?  
The development of technologies is unpredictable and unforeseen.65
Additionally, government has an even harder task in ascertaining 
technical advances than firms because it depends upon firms sharing 
state-of-the-art information.  Such firms have an incentive to 
withhold and mislead the government to ensure that technology-
forcing standards are lax and easily met.  A final problem with 
63
 Richard R. Nelson, Government Stimulus of Technological Progress:  Lessons 
from American History, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS 451, 472 
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982).  See also Eric Lipton & James Glanz, Sweeping 
Changes Pushed For Code On City High-Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A1 
(noting how building codes are slow to change and incorporate new technologies 
such as sprinkler systems). 
64
 A number of commentators have criticized technology-forcing regulation.  See 
STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 106-07 (1982); Robert A. 
Leone, Technology-Forcing Public Policies and the Automobile, in ESSAYS IN 
TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND POLITICS:  A HANDBOOK IN HONOR OF JOHN 
R. MEYER 291 (Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that we must 
consider alternatives to technology-forcing); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in 
Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1061-67 (1983) (noting the problems with 
technology-forcing regulation); see infra note 104 (providing further criticisms on 
the use of technology-forcing for environmental standards. But see infra note 105
(providing a response from supporters of technology-forcing regulation).
65
 Nelson, supra note 63, at 454 (noting the uncertainty of technological advance 
based on a number of case studies); Robert W. Lucky, Pondering the 
Unpredictability of the Sociotechnical System, in ENGINEERING AS A SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISE 89 (Hedy E. Sladovich ed., 1991).
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technology-forcing regulation is compliance costs.  The more radical 
a change is, the higher the cost to industry, and the greater the 
incentive for firms to limit the regulations.  Instead of developing or 
diffusing new technologies, this can lead to firms that try to reduce 
their costs by regulatory capture and litigation.66
In addressing the criticisms listed above, a policymaker must 
first justify the use of a technology-forcing regulation.  In deciding to 
use a technology-forcing regulation, a regulator uses a stick approach 
rather than a carrot approach.67  Both the inefficiency of market-
based incentives and their politically unfeasibility favor technology-
forcing regulation.  
Technology-forcing regulations can be more efficient than 
market-based regulatory programs in two situations.68  The first 
situation occurs when there are no existing technologies that address 
a societal concern.  In this case, industry must be forced to develop 
new technologies.69  For example, in passing the Clean Air Act, 
Congress was addressing public health concerns with little regard to 
technological or economic limitations.70  A second situation occurs 
66
 Another problem is obsolete technology-forcing standards.  Since Congress does 
not revise regulations, periodically technology-forcing standards may become not 
feasible or in need of revision.  This then shifts the problem of setting and 
enforcing these regulations to courts. Carolyn McNiven, Using Severability 
Clauses to Solve the Attainment Deadline Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 
CALIF. L. REV. 1255 (1992) (suggesting courts be given the power through 
severability clauses to remove obsolete deadlines).
67
 Leone, supra note 64, at 303.
68 See infra Part II.C (discussing market-based regulatory programs).
69
 "[F]or some pollutants in particular industries there may be no existing or 
theoretical control technology; the control of pollution will then require the 
development of entirely new control equipment or manufacturing processes-that is, 
it will be necessary to force major technological innovation."  La Pierre, supra note 
70, at 773 (1977).
70
 During the passage of the Clean Air Act, Senator Muskie the manager of the 
Senate bill stated, “The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of 
technological or economic judgments or even to be limited by what is or appears to 
be technologically or economically feasible. Our responsibility is to establish what
the public interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may mean that 
people and industries will be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the 
present time." 116 Cong.Rec. 32901-32902 (1970).  But see D. Bruce La Pierre, 
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. 
REV. 771, 837 (1977) (noting that although health-based standards can induce 
major innovation, the EPA and courts have favored technology-based standards 
that take into account economic constraints).  Several commentators have written 
about the technology-forcing aspects of the Clean Air Act.  See Bonine, The 
Evolution of Technology Forcing In The Clean Air Act, ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
(Monograph No. 21) (1975); Russell V. Randle, Forcing Technology:  The Clean 
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when the technology exists, but the technology cost is low while the 
monitoring cost is high.71  In this situation, technology-forcing 
regulation is more efficient than a market-based regulatory program.  
The second situation involves technology-forcing regulations which 
can be justified based on political expediency, because they provide 
a clear objective, a direct method, and a tangible outcome for 
legislators.72  In contrast to this approach, addressing market 
externalities with market incentives can be politically difficult.  
Economists use this line of reasoning when arguing that the best 
method for increasing automobile fuel efficiency is a gasoline tax.  
However, since no politician will support such a measure,73 instead 
society has had to rely on technology-forcing regulations for 
improved fuel efficiency.74
Setting technology-forcing standards is a significant issue 
when the government requires firms to develop new technologies 
because of the unpredictability of technological advances.75  In this 
situation, standard-setting proves difficult because it is not clear what 
the cost to the firms will be for developing the technology.76
Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979). This issue was recently visited by 
the Supreme Court.  The Court held that the government is not required to consider 
financial impact when setting air quality standards.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
explicitly noted the validity of the technology-forcing nature of the Clean Air Act. 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001).
71
 Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?  
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory 
Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WISC. L. REV. 887, 937 (1999).
72
 Leone, supra note 64, at 295.
73
 In contrast, Europe has used taxes as a regulatory tool.  See Charles D. Patterson, 
Environmental Taxes and Subsidies:  What Is the Appropriate Fiscal Policy For 
Dealing with Modern Environmental Problems, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 121, 167 (2000) (noting the popularity of taxes in other countries).
74
 Technology-forcing standards can focus an industry’s attention on a problem in 
a direct way.  For example, in theory automakers historically have always had an 
interest in auto safety as a way differentiating their products and selling more cars.  
But in reality, it took Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed and subsequent 
legislation to focus the automakers on the issue of safety.  See Leone, supra note 
64, at 302, 310.
75 See Nelson, supra note 65.  
76 See Eban Goodstein, Polluted Data, AM. PROSPECT, (Nov. 1997) (arguing that 
industry often inflates its estimated costs of complying with technology-forcing 
regulation).  For example, the Clean Air Act was not concerned about the current 
level of technological feasibility.  Its goal was to radically advance the state-of-the-
art technology for reducing air pollution.  See supra note 70.  The issue of 
technology-forcing regulation was recently visited by the Supreme Court.  The 
Court held that the government is not required to consider financial impact when 
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Consequently, in setting technology-forcing regulation, it is 
necessary for regulators to gather the relevant expertise to understand 
the state-of-the-art information as well as to understand the 
industry’s history in technological innovation.77  However, if a 
government agency cannot gather the necessary information or 
legislators are concerned about regulatory capture during the 
information gathering process, an alternative method of regulation 
may be necessary.78
A related issue concerns the need for government to have a 
clear understanding of the harm it is trying to prevent or the benefit it 
is trying to produce.79  Examining automotive safety regulations, one 
can see that it unclear as to how much harm the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) wishes to prevent.80  This 
example is directly analogous to the issues facing code developers.  
In order for code-based technology-forcing regulation to be 
successful, it must be clear what societal concerns are being 
addressed.  Without this clarity, an agency would quickly run into 
problems persuading the public and firms that its regulations created 
societal benefits. 
Another issue technology-forcing regulation must confront is 
compliance.  Firms are motivated to avoid compliance in a direct 
setting air quality standards.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence explicitly noted the 
validity of the technology-forcing nature of the Clean Air Act. Whitman v. 
American Trucking Associations Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903 (2001).
77 See Ashford, supra note 52, at 422.
78
 The probability of capture is higher because the government must closely 
interact with firms for information on their capabilities.
79
 In setting technology-forcing regulation, the regulator must consider the efficacy 
of the proposed regulation.  The standard for efficacy depends upon whether the 
regulation is focused on forcing firms to create new technologies or incorporating 
existing technology into their products.  In the first case, a regulator is trying to 
foster innovation.  Therefore, the regulation should be focused on bottlenecks to 
technological development.  For example, in the case of electric vehicles being 
pursued as a method of reducing pollution, Leone argues that technology-forcing 
regulations have revealed bottlenecks in power plant emission control, lead battery 
recycling, and consumer learning.  Therefore, he believes that technology-forcing 
regulations for electric vehicles are wasteful.  The issues are different when 
requiring firms to incorporate existing technologies into their products.  In this 
case, the government is concerned with widely diffusing a technology.  The 
success of this method hinges upon the cost of the technology that can be reduced 
over time.  This requires firms to have either an incentive for continued innovation 
or economies of scale to reduce costs.  Leone, supra note 64, at 320
80
 Should an automobile survive a 30 m.p.h. head-on crash or a 50 m.p.h. crash?  
Michael J. Trebilcock, Requiem for Regulators: The Passing of a Counter-
Culture?, 8 Y. J. REG. 497, 505-06 (1991)
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proportion to the cost of the technology-forcing regulation.  As such, 
ensuring that firms comply and develop or diffuse the necessary 
technology requires a determined regulator.  Absent such a regulator, 
firms will try to delay or reduce technology-forcing regulation.  After 
all, technology-forcing regulation relies upon a stick as opposed to a 
carrot approach.  At times, delay may be the prudent course for 
society.  However, if firms are generally successful in using this 
tactic it effectively neutralizes the use of technology-forcing 
regulation.
Regardless of the difficulties found in implementing it, 
technology-forcing regulation has led to numerous innovations,81
including improved environmental quality,82 safer automobiles,83
cleaner automobile emissions,84 and improved disclosure.85  For 
81 See Ashford et al. supra note 52, (providing a number of examples of how 
technology-forcing regulation led to innovation).
82 See Nicholas A. Ashford, An Innovation-Based Strategy for a Sustainable 
Environment, in INNOVATION-ORIENTED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 67, 85 
(Kemmelskamp et al. eds., 2000). 
83
 Technology-forcing regulation has led to many safety improvements including 
seat belts, air bags, and bumpers.  These regulations have been acknowledged as 
successful, because the savings in safety outweighed the regulatory costs.  See 
ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET. AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 155-56 (1986).
84
 Technology-forcing regulations have led to internal combustion engines that 
emit ninety six percent less emissions.  This type of reduction was thought to be 
infeasible when the regulations were first mandated.  However, the overall 
assessment of this effort is mixed, because while there are lower automotive 
emissions, it is not clear whether this has led to clear improvements in public 
health.  See CRANDALL, supra note 83, at 156-57 (arguing that the costs of 
emission regulation are higher than its benefits).  Moreover, it is not clear whether 
there were other options, such as emissions fees, that could have led to the same 
technical advances.  See Leone, supra note 64, at 292.  For others, the development 
of new technologies such as catalytic exhaust treatment and low-emission vehicles 
show the merit of technology-forcing regulation.  See Ashley Morris Bale, The 
Newest Frontier in Motor Vehicle Emission Control:  The Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213 (1995).
85
 The Securities and Exchange Commission mandates that companies file their 
documents electronically through EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system.  This system accelerates “the receipt, acceptance, 
dissemination, and analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the 
agency.”  The goal is to “increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities 
market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy.”  Important 
Information About EDGAR, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm
(last modified June 28, 1999).  See also Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United 
States Securities Regulation:  An Essay on Regulation in an Age of Technological 
Uncertainty, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 83 (2001) (arguing that EDGAR is an example 
of how the SEC is changing from a technology-forcing strategy to a reactive or 
obstructionist strategy because the SEC has not updated EDGAR).
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example, the development of the automobile airbag resulted from the 
development of standards for a "passive occupant restraint system.”  
These NHTSA developed these new standards in the late 1960s.  
While industry fought this requirement, eventually such technology 
was developed and has since become standard equipment on 
automobiles.86  Nonetheless, the NHTSA has moved away from a 
technology-forcing regulatory approach toward a more reactive 
approach in automobile regulation.87
There are numerous examples of code-based technology-
forcing regulation: filtering software,88 closed captioning,89 v-chip,90
accessibility,91 enhanced 911,92 and digital broadcasting.93  While a 
86 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
49 (1983) (noting the technology-forcing nature of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
for automobile airbags).
87
 A reason for the failure of technology-forcing regulation is the judicial system.  
The NHTSA began by using technology-forcing rulemaking.  However, over time 
the NHTSA has moved toward a reactive strategy based largely around safety 
defects.  It has been argued that this occurred largely because of judicial second-
guessing.  See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of 
Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2000).  See generally
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 69-
105 (1990) (documenting the changes in NHTSA from technology-forcing to a 
more reactive regulation strategy); P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, AUTOMOBILE SAFETY 
REGULATION:  TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 149-54
(1977) (discussing NHTSA's difficulties with forcing manufacturers to develop 
new technologies).  
88
 Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(A) (2001); Cole & 
Grossman, supra note 71.
89
 The incorporation of closed captioning technology was similar to the 
incorporation of the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) tuner.  Before government 
regulation, consumers were forced to buy an expensive stand-alone decoder.  See 
DuBow, supra note 61 (providing a history of legislative process to require 
manufacturers to incorporate closed captioning).
90
 The V-chip was a relatively simply technology based on the modification of the 
closed captioning technology.  See Kristen S. Burns, Protecting the Child:  The V-
Chip Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & 
ENT. L. & POL’Y 143 (1996); Lisa D. Cornacchia, The V-Chip: A Little Thing But a 
Big Deal, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 385 (2001). 
91
 The Telecommunications Act requires manufacturers of telecommunication 
products and services to make their products and services accessible whenever it is 
"readily achievable".  Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 255 (1996).  
92
 In 1996, the FCC adopted regulations that require wireless carriers to deliver 911 
calls and provide the location of the wireless emergency call.  To meet these 
regulations, wireless carriers have had to develop new technologies.  See Matthew 
Mickle Werdegar, Lost? The Government Knows Where You Are:  Cellular 
Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 103 (1998) (noting that the FCC has been repeatedly asked by 
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thorough assessment of technology-forcing regulations for code is 
needed, a few lessons can be gleaned from a brief analysis of the 
examples noted above.  First, in code-based regulation, it appears 
that technology-forcing regulation is often favored over market-
based incentives.  Government prefers to simply require 
manufacturers to modify their code.  Secondly, regulations focused 
on preventing harm are easier to justify.  Concerns about safety and 
violence have led to clearer guidelines and more political support.  
Technology-forcing regulations that produce less clear benefits 
(which becomes more important when we consider compliance 
costs), such as accessibility and digital broadcasting, are much harder 
to justify.  The third lesson is that compliance costs matter, 
especially when firms are forced to provide a vague benefit to the 
public, such as digital broadcasting.  The high cost of compliance 
with digital broadcasting has led many to wonder if such technology-
forcing regulation was needed at all, or whether the market would 
have been a better mechanism for addressing such uncertain public 
benefits.94
In 1996, the government passed the CDA, making it unlawful 
to transmit indecent or obscene material over the Internet to 
minors.95  While this law focused on prohibition, it served a 
technology-forcing purpose.  The CDA encouraged the development 
of technologies that limited the transmission of indecent material to 
minors.  The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) was 
developed, as a direct result of this law, by the World Wide Web 
Consortium to challenge the constitutionality of the CDA by 
industry to delay implementation, although it appears that industry will be able to 
comply); Peter P. Ten Eyck, Dial 911 and Report a Congressional Empty Promise:  
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 54 FED. COMM. L.J.
53 (2001) (arguing we need to tighten the existing rules for enhanced 911 to foster 
the development of a seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable wireless communication 
network with 911). For background on Enhanced 911 see 
http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/.
93
 In 1997, Congress mandated a transition to digital television by 2006.  The 
technology in 1997 was in its infancy and for the most part not even commercially 
available.  The intent of the law was to spur the development of digital television 
by not allowing broadcasters to transmit analog signals after 2006.  See The 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 §§ 3003 (1997); 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COMPLETING THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL 
TELEVISION (1999), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index= 
1544&sequence=0&from=1.
94
 Alan Murray, Failed Policy on HDTV Illustrates Why Free Markets Can Be 
Trusted, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A4.
95
 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §223 (1997).
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showing that there were less restrictive means for controlling 
indecent content on the Internet.96  Nevertheless, PICS has not solved 
the problem of minors gaining access to inappropriate content.  In 
fact, the CDA has several glaring weaknesses.  First, consider that 
the CDA clearly gave up on the market.  While the market was not 
providing an adequate solution to the problem of the minors gaining 
access to inappropriate content, there was no reason to believe that 
the government could not create incentives to encourage the market 
to address this problem.  The second problem with the justification 
for the CDA was its efficacy.  The CDA didn’t acknowledge that the 
technology existed to address the problem.  At the time of the CDA, 
there were filtering products available that ensured minors did not 
access inappropriate content.  It seems clear that if a certain 
technology exists, the rationale for a technology-forcing regulation 
should be promoting its diffusion.  Clearly, the CDA was not the best 
method to ensure a wide diffusion of filtering software.  Instead, the 
government should have considered incentives or an outright 
regulation mandating filtering software.  In the end, the justification 
for the CDA seems to have been more about political expediency 
than about addressing a societal concern.  Indeed, the CDA was 
largely considered to be unconstitutional, and thus ineffective, from 
its very beginning.97
Another concern is whether the CDA was addressing a well-
defined harm.  The CDA regulated both obscene and indecent 
communications, and while the harm from obscene communications 
was widely recognized, the harm from indecent communications was 
not agreed upon.  In fact, the most vigorous debate over the CDA 
concerned the banning of indecent material that, in some cases, was 
useful for minors, such as sexual education material.98  Such an 
example illustrates the inappropriateness of technology-forcing 
regulation when government does not have a well-defined harm to 
address.
The final problem with the CDA concerns compliance.  It 
was never clear how government would monitor and enforce the 
96
 Interview with James Miller, Designer for PICS, in Bloomington, Ill. (Aug. 13, 
1999).
97 See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications 
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 51 (1996) (noting the constitutional problems with the CDA).
98 Reno, 521 U.S. at 877.
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CDA on a worldwide medium.99  While government could clearly 
make an impact, it seemed reasonable that any significant impact 
would require international cooperation.  The CDA did not consider 
this issue at all.
2. Methods of Standards Regulation
There are two general methods of regulating with standards: 
using a performance standard or a design standard.  Performance 
standards do not specify a technology, but instead set forth 
guidelines for how a technology should operate.100  This allows the 
market to create and shape a product as it sees fit.  This is the 
principal advantage of performance standards.  The flexibility of 
performance standards is the reason why firms prefer to develop 
technologies to meet performance standards.101  At the other 
extreme, we have regulations specifying design standards.  Design 
standards state precisely how a technology must operate.  The 
advantage of a design standard for the government is enforceability.  
Manufacturers have strict guidelines for building a product, and an 
inspector can easily ascertain compliance.  In contrast, the flexibility 
of a performance standard can lead to problems with enforceability 
due to the lack of specificity over the correct testing procedure to 
meet a performance standard.102
A middle ground between design standards and performance 
standards are the “best available technology” (BAT) regulations.  
These regulations are typically focused on gradually removing a 
harm based upon the available technology.  Statutes are often worded 
to require the use of “reasonably available control technology” or the 
99
 David L. Sobel, The Constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act: 
Censorship on the Internet, 1 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2 (1996) (noting the problems 
with jurisdiction).
100 BREYER, supra note 64, at 105.  An example that Cargill provides is the EU 
Privacy Initiative, which sets limitations on the use of data mining in Europe.  As a 
result, code that contains these features can no longer be sold in Europe.  This 
performance standard sets a limitation on firms developing code by limiting their 
potential market. See Carl F. Cargill, The Role of Consortia Standards in Federal 
Government Procurements in the Information Technology Sector:  Towards a Re-
Definition of a Voluntary Consensus Standards Organization, (June 28, 2001), at 
5, available at http://www.sun.com/standards/HouseWhitePaper_ver2_Final.PDF.
101 BREYER, supra note 64, at 105.  
102 BREYER, supra note 64, at 105-06; Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based 
Regulation: Prospects
and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV.  705 (2003).
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“lowest achievable emission rate.”103  While, the main use of BAT 
regulations has been to reduce pollution, they have been criticized 
for not accounting for differences among users, imposing a large 
burden on agencies for enforcement and information gathering, and 
serving to slow technological innovation.104  The counterargument to 
these criticisms is that the BAT approach provides a much simpler 
regulatory process that is even-handed, easily enforced,105 and can 
adapt to changing circumstances because of its reliance on what is 
reasonably available rather than specifying a numerical value.
Recognizing each of their strengths and weaknesses, all three 
of these approaches can be used to shape code.  However, there 
clearly are tradeoffs between these options.  While performance 
standards provide a great deal of flexibility and allow for market-
based solutions,106 design standards are fixed approaches, but allow 
the government to easily ensure compliance.  In the development of 
digital broadcasting, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has been criticized for using design standards to protect users 
from interference.107  Critics believed these regulations were too 
precise and instead industry should have been granted more freedom 
to deal with interference problems.108  Finally, the BAT approach 
103 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS:  A 
USER’S GUIDE 90 (1995).
104 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 88 (1990).  See also
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (criticizing the Best Available Technology regulation 
strategy).  
105 See Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1267 (1985) (arguing that best available technology standards are more effective 
given the costs of regulatory decision-making); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:  The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation,
1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (1991) (responding to Sunstein’s criticisms); Wendy E. 
Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 
(arguing that the best available technology approach is more expeditious, 
enforceable, even-handed, and adaptable).
106
 For example, government legislation requires schools and libraries to use some 
type of “technology protection measure” for online material that is harmful to 
minors.  This performance standard allows schools and libraries to select the 
solution that best fits their own requirements Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(A) (2001); Cole & Grossman, supra note 71. 
107
 Advanced Television Systems Committee, Transmission Measurement And 
Compliance For Digital Television, Revision A, May 20, 2000 available at
http://www.atsc.org/standards.html.
108 See Federal Communications Commission, Economic Considerations for 
Alternative Digital Television Standards, (Nov. 1, 1996), available at http://
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encompasses standards that can change over time.  An example of a 
hypothetical code-based BAT standard is requiring government 
agencies to use the “best available encryption technology in the 
storage of medical information.”  This standard would require 
government agencies to update their systems as more effective 
technologies are developed.
C. Using Market-Based Regulation
Critics of either standard-setting or the command and control, 
top-down, approach often propose using market-based incentives as 
an alternative to direct rulemaking.  Market-based incentives can be 
based upon a number of different economic instruments and are more 
efficient than standard-setting.109  That is, the cost of regulating a 
harm with market-based incentives is generally less than with 
government mandated standard-setting.
In this section, we focus on the use of taxes and marketable 
property rights for regulating code.  While, taxes can be used to 
penalize a particular conduct or technology (consider the gas-guzzler 
tax on automobiles that are not fuel-efficient).110  Marketable 
property rights utilize the market as an allocation mechanism to limit 
conduct or a technology.  This regulatory scheme, which allows 
firms to buy and sell their property rights to others, has been used to 
address a variety of societal concerns from congestion to pollution.
The choice between marketable property rights and taxes is 
largely a choice between a price-based system and a quantity-based 
system.  In using taxes, the government is increasing the price of 
undesirable behavior.  In using marketable property rights, the 
government is fixing the amount of undesirable behavior that is 
acceptable to society.  As a result, a tax-based system has an 
uncertain impact on undesirable behavior, but the cost is known to 
www.fcc.gov/Reports/ec961101.txt,http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Ord
ers/1996/fcc96493.txt (noting the design standards nature of the FCC’s 
requirements by Bruce Owen); Federal Communications Commission, Advanced 
Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast 
Service, (Dec. 24, 1996), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/1996/fcc96493.txt (noting comments by the National 
Cable and Telecommunications Association on the design standard aspect of 
ATSC standard).
109 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT:  THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS (1994) 
(discussing various economic instruments).
110
 Gas Guzzler Tax, 26 USC § 4064.
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firms.  A marketable property rights scheme can have a fixed impact 
on the undesirable behavior, but the cost to firms is unknown.  
Therefore, a crucial decision for regulators is whether they are 
concerned about setting a target for reducing the undesirable 
behavior or for fixing the cost that is borne by firms.111
Two principal criticisms of market-based approaches exist.  
The first is that its theoretical efficiency does not appear in the real 
world.  Rather, the problem of monitoring and funding such 
programs leads to a higher cost for government than using standard-
setting regulation.  The second criticism rests on moral/ethical 
grounds.  In using a market-based incentive, society is saying that it 
is acceptable to engage in a socially undesirable behavior.  For some 
critics, this is intolerable.  As an extreme example, it is simply wrong 
for government to use a market-based approach to regulate murder.  
In this context, individuals and firms should not be allowed to 
engage in murder by merely paying a “murder” tax.  The following 
sections address these criticisms and highlight the advantages of 
these methods in shaping and regulating code.
1. Taxes
The government uses its power of taxation as a powerful tool 
for shaping code.  In using this power, the government can increase 
an individual’s or firm’s tax burden to encourage certain behavior.  
This section examines how taxes or fees can be used to penalize a 
particular activity or product.112  As an example, the gas-guzzler tax 
on automobiles is an alternative to regulation or classic standard-
setting.113  In this section, we discuss when taxes are preferable to 
using regulation in deterring socially undesirable behavior or 
products. 
There are two approaches to using taxes, fees and penalties.  
The first approach, fees, usually consists of a monetary penalty on a 
product or activity that is unrelated to the user’s income.  In general, 
a fee is more appropriate when users can be readily excluded from 
111 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PUTTING 
MARKETS TO WORK:  THE DESIGN AND USE OF MARKETABLE PERMITS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 26 (1997).
112 See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation:  A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty 
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989) (discussing the use of tax penalties).
113 BREYER, supra note 64, at 164 (standard-setting); MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY 
OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 121 (1999) 
(providing a detailed discussion on the tradeoffs for using taxes as a substitute for 
regulation). 
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receiving the relevant service or product.114  This is the case with 
alcohol, the gas-guzzler tax, and fees on the sale of tires to finance 
cleanup of improper tire disposal sites.115  The second approach, tax 
penalties, is analogous to tax expenditures, but serves to penalize 
rather than reward.116  Throughout this section, we will use the term 
taxes to refer to both fees and taxes based on the income tax.
There are several objections to using taxes as an alternative to 
regulation.  The first questions the efficiency of taxes because of the 
difficulty of setting the right price for a tax.  A tax will lead to some 
taxpayers changing their behavior, but other taxpayers may not 
change their behavior, and instead, just pay the tax.  The critical 
issue is setting the right level for the tax.117  If the tax is too high, the 
government will discourage too much of the activity.  If the tax is too 
low, the government will not discourage enough of the activity.  The 
second objection also considers the efficiency of this approach, but 
focuses instead on the administrative costs.  When using a tax 
penalty, the government must enforce, collect, and dispose the taxes.  
This is a weighty burden for government.  The final objection is that 
the use of taxes is morally wrong in certain circumstances.  Taxes 
allow the disfavored behavior to continue as long as the monetary 
penalties are paid.  Entities that have adequate financial resources are 
not then affected by the tax.  Additionally, if the penalty affects the 
income tax, it will not be a strong deterrent to those firms or 
individuals with low tax rates.  In either situation, the tax is 
inadequate to prevent certain individuals and firms from performing 
the socially undesirable activity.
The first issue that a regulator must address is the question of 
setting the tax accurately.  This issue is not formidable.  Just as with 
a regulation, government will have to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of any action it undertakes.  Based on this data, the government can 
establish a tax at the right level.  The advantage of using a tax over 
other methods is that its initial impact upon the industry can be 
accurately forecasted.  Moreover, if the tax is either too high or too 
low, it can be later adjusted to the socially optimal level.
114 KELMAN, supra note 113.
115 See David J. DePippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized, With 
a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543 (noting sin taxes such as 
those on alcohol); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics V. Equity:  Do Market-Based 
Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Justice, 56 WASH. LEE L. REV.
111 (noting taxes on pollution).
116
 Zolt, supra note 112, at 348-50 (defining tax penalties within the income tax 
system).
117 BREYER, supra note 64, at 165 (noting the problem of setting regulatory taxes).
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The second question concerns administrative costs.  When 
government seeks to reduce undesirable conduct, it will either use 
regulation or a market-based incentive such as a tax.118  In both 
cases, the government will bear the administrative costs.  In the case 
of regulations, the government spends its resources setting and 
enforcing regulations.  With taxes, the government spends its 
resources collecting, enforcing, and disposing the proceeds.119  Since 
government already has an established taxing system, taxes may be 
preferable to regulations because of their low administrative cost (as 
long as the tax can be collected with minimal non-compliance).120
The third objection to using taxes is a moral one.  To address 
this concern, we believe taxes should be limited to those actions that 
society deems wrong but allowable.  In general, taxes are best used 
when individuals and firms may be allowed to continue to engage in 
a socially undesirable activity at a low level.  In other words, the cost 
of discovering the activity is not outweighed by the detriment of the 
activity.  This permits a certain degree of flexibility across a 
population or industry.  As a result, this unevenness in the 
distribution of burden for taxes limits its use to particular cases.  If an 
activity involves fundamental rights, such as worker safety or 
discrimination, taxes are generally inappropriate and clear-cut 
regulation is the preferred solution.121  This is, at least in part, 
because we value equal treatment when it comes to individual 
rights.122  Consequently, taxes are preferable in situations where 
society is not confronting basic rights and is comfortable with an 
unequal distribution of the desired activity across society.123
118 KELMAN, supra note 113.
119 BREYER, supra note 64, at 170-71 (discussing the disposing of tax revenue 
proceeds).
120 KELMAN, supra note 113, at 94-95 (noting various factors that affect the 
administrative cost).  But see Zolt, supra note 112, at 374-76 (questioning the lost 
administrative costs of tax penalties).  
121
 Kelman argues that there is a difference in regulation and taxes when it comes 
to rights.  As Kelman put it “regulation, properly done, has liberal priority over 
taxation and spending; it purifies the private sphere of rights violations, a task to be 
achieved before redistribution (through taxing and spending).”  KELMAN, supra 
note 113, at 121-22.
122 See Gloria E. Hefland, Standards Versus Taxes in Pollution Control, in 
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 223, 245 (Jeroen 
C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999) (arguing that although tax penalties are more 
efficient than standards, standards are the preferred solution by policymakers, 
because standards emphasize the antisocial nature of polluting).
123 See infra text accompanying notes 142-143 (providing further discussion on the 
ethical issue of a market-based incentive permitting socially undesirable behavior).
31
Taxes are preferable to regulation when it is possible to 
influence consumer behavior.124  In contrast to the cost of complying 
with regulatory standards, the cost of paying taxes can be estimated.  
These costs can then be easily communicated to the consumer in the 
final cost of the product or through tax advisors.  Consumers are thus 
aware of both the costs as well as the governmental policy 
disfavoring a specific activity or product.  As a result, this influences 
consumers toward products and activities that are not subject to a tax.  
Indeed, firms have a continued incentive to innovate and improve 
their technologies to reduce their tax burden.  Similarly, taxes are 
preferable to tax expenditures or direct spending because they are not 
limited by budgetary constraints.125
There are two reasons why taxes are uncommon.  The first is 
political: no one wants to raise taxes.  Instead, a regulation is 
preferable.  The second reason is that established firms prefer a 
standard-setting regulation to a tax.  This is because, from the 
viewpoint of a firm, taxes cost more than regulation.126
One potential application for taxing code is the problem of 
unsolicited bulk e-mail (spam).  By placing a tax on each email 
message, the government would provide an incentive not to send an 
email message.  This would also reduce email congestion.  If this tax 
was small, e.g., $.01/message, this would have a minimal impact 
124
 Taxes use market mechanisms to transmit information to the consumer by 
charging a price for currently unpriced goods and services provided by the natural 
environment.  See Wen-yuan Huang & Michael LeBlanc, Market-Based Incentives 
for Addressing Non-Point Water Quality Problems:  A Residual Nitrogen Tax 
Approach, 16 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 427 (1994).
125
  For example, to address concerns about climate change, the government could 
subsidize the use of alternative fuels.  Alternatively, the government could place a 
tax on conventional fuel.  The tax is functionally equivalent to the subsidy of 
alternative fuels.  However, while the subsidy is limited by the government’s 
budget, the tax has no such limitation. Chris Edwards et al., Cool Code:  Federal 
Tax Incentives to Mitigate Global Warming, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 465, 475 (1998).
126 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political 
Response:  Direct Controls versus Taxes, 65 AMER. ECON. REV. 139; Thomas W. 
Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 288.  Taxes on 
ozone-depleting chemicals as well as the gas-guzzler tax have shaped technologies.  
26 U.S.C. §§ 4681, 4682 (1988 ed., Supp. III) (ozone tax); 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (gas 
guzzler excise tax).  Other taxed undesirable activities have included doing 
business with South Africa, engaging in greenmail transactions, and entering into 
golden parachute arrangements.  See Zolt, supra note 112, at 344 (noting common 
examples of tax penalties).  For example, Singapore has used tax surcharges on 
older cars and varying toll fees to cut congestion.   Smart Card Taxes Singapore 
Drivers, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/asia-pacific/78172.stm.
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upon most email users, while subjecting bulk e-mailers who may 
send out millions of e-mail messages to a significant tax burden.127
The major objection to this proposal is neither the proper setting of 
the tax nor the moral propriety of such a tax.  Instead, the issue is 
ensuring compliance.  A firm or an individual can send e-mail 
messages, whether bulk or not, with minimal equipment and training.  
The ease of sending e-mail stems from the open philosophy designed 
into e-mail technologies with its roots in academia.  This has led to 
proposals that the underlying structure for transmitted e-mail 
messages be modified.128   Nevertheless, using current technologies, 
it would be very difficult to ensure compliance with such a tax. Here, 
a tax would not serve as an effective method for shaping code.
2. Marketable Property Rights
An alternative market-based regulatory mechanism is the use 
of a property-based system.  Fundamental to this idea is that by 
creating property or a property right that can then be exchanged in 
the marketplace, the regulator is depending on the superior allocative 
efficiency of the market over government allocation.129  For 
example, the government can either create property in a tangible or 
intangible form, such as land, copyright, or even privacy.  
Government can also create a property right that allows an entity to 
engage in specific conduct, e.g., to pollute through sulphur dioxide 
emissions.  The resulting property right allows an individual to use 
the property as well as to sell the property as she sees fit.  In some 
cases, the government may create a trading system for a property 
right to ensure its efficient transfer.  This allows the use of prices as a 
signal and an incentive, which should theoretically lead to an 
efficient distribution of the property.  Moreover, by limiting and 
reducing marketable property rights, the government can reduce or 
eliminate the pertinent conduct.  Thus, a marketable property right is 
127 See Declan McCullagh, Send Out Spam, Pay the Bill, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 23, 
2000, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,34520,00.html 
(describing a method to charge senders for sending e-mail messages).
128
 Katharine Mieszkowski, E-mail is Broken, SALON, Oct. 2, 2003, available at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/10/02/e_mail/index_np.html.
129
 This concept was first developed in J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND 
PRICES (1968).  See also Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and 
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L. J. 2039, 2093-2097 (1993) (providing 
an overview of the use of marketable property rights as an alternative regulatory 
mechanism).
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an efficient method for the government to limit either a harm or a 
technology.
The creation of marketable property rights has been used to 
regulate a variety of issues from congestion to pollution.130  In the 
United States, marketable property rights have been created for 
eliminating lead in gasoline, reducing ozone-depleting gases in 
accordance with the Montreal Protocol, reducing sulphur oxides, and 
reducing pollutants in the Los Angeles area.131  In these cases, the 
government created a system to trade marketable property rights.  By 
limiting and reducing the amount of marketable property rights, the 
government can control the extent of an activity.
Several problems arise when using marketable property 
rights.  The first is the inefficiency due to the high administrative 
costs needed in the creation and administration of marketable 
property rights; government must define, allocate, sell, and monitor 
the use of these property rights.  These high administrative costs 
suggest that marketable property rights are an inefficient solution as 
compared to standards based regulation.  The second problem 
concerns the strategic use of marketable property rights.  Since there 
are no perfectly competitive markets, firms can distort the intent of 
marketable property rights to their advantage.  The final problem is 
that the use of marketable property rights is also questioned on 
ethical grounds.
Government must acknowledge that there are administrative 
costs in creating and administering marketable property rights.132  It 
needs to evaluate these costs in considering whether to opt for 
standards based regulation or for a marketable property rights 
program.  The first issue that the government must struggle with is 
defining the property.  The metes and bounds of the property right is 
not a trivial issue – it will be contested.133  Second, once a 
130 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
111.
131
 Tom Tietenberg, Lessons From Using Transferable Permits to Control Air 
Pollution in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 275, 275 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999).
132 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 170 (providing 
background on the administrative issues); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, 
Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 7 
YALE J. REG. 369, 374-77 (1989) (noting administrative issues in the use of 
marketable property rights).
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 The defining of property rights is a continuing issue for government, because 
uncertainty can lead to inefficiencies.  See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, 
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marketable right is established, how should the rights be allocated?  
For example, should they be auctioned?134  Or should existing users 
get free marketable rights through grandfathering?135  Third, 
government may have to create and administer a trading system for 
the property right.  This is a crucial ingredient since an efficient 
market depends upon low transactions costs for property transfer.136
The final issue for the government is ensuring compliance.  
Government must ensure that firms have the proper property rights to 
engage in the regulated conduct.  Otherwise, firms will continue to 
conduct the activity or use the technology without specific property 
rights.  In fact, low monitoring costs are essential for a marketable 
property rights scheme to be successful.137
Although theoretical, a perfect market in which no actor has 
market power does not actually exist.138  Hence, one expects firms to 
attempt to distort the market to their advantage.  Firms could use 
their influence to collude to keep prices low or set pricing levels.139
Or firms could buy up the marketable property to create a barrier to 
entry for new firms.140  The government must strive to achieve a 
closely competitive market when establishing the marketable 
property right.  Otherwise, government must rely upon antitrust law 
to ensure competition.141
The final issue to address is the moral argument against 
marketable property rights.142  This issue is focused not on 
efficiency, but on ethical concerns.  When government creates a 
Where Did All The Markets Go?  An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions Trading 
Program, 6 YALE J. REG. 109 (1989).
134 See Paul Koustaal, Tradable Permits in Economic Theory, in HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 265, 271-02 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den 
Bergh ed., 1999).  See also Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable 
Property Rights, 99 Q.J. ECON. 753, 753-65 (1984) (noting how allocation can 
affect the efficiency of marketable property rights). 
135
 Koustaal, supra note 134, at 268. See also Merrill, supra note 126, at 284 
(noting the predominant use of grandfathering).
136 BREYER, supra note 64, at 173; Koustaal, supra note 134, at 270-71 (noting 
transactions costs in trading).
137 See Cole & Grossman, supra note 71, at 937; Koustaal, supra note 134, at 271; 
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Regulation, INTER. ECON. J., Autumn 1999, at 89.
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ENVIRONMENT (1981) (providing a thorough discussion of the moral basis 
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property right, they are tacitly approving the behavior.  Moreover, 
government is removing the stigma attached to the conduct by 
creating property rights.  This is one of the reasons why people have 
been opposed to market-based approaches to minimize pollution.  
This is similar to concerns about inequality in using taxes.143
Therefore, a regulator should try to avoid creating a marketable 
property right when society uniformly regards an activity as morally 
wrong.
An advantage to using marketable property rights is that they 
are generally more efficient than standard-setting regulatory 
approaches.144  In using marketable property rights, entities allocate 
the marketable property rights among themselves using a pricing 
mechanism.  This approach is much more efficient than when the 
government mandates the allocations of property rights for each 
entity.  It simply would be too expensive and burdensome for the 
government to collect information on individual costs to make this 
allocation.  Moreover, the pricing mechanism provides firms with 
flexibility because they can choose their own allocation of property 
rights.  Firms may decide to purchase additional property rights or 
they may choose to earn revenue by selling their property rights.  
This flexibility contrasts with the uniformity of standard-setting 
measures.  As a result, theoretically, the marketable property right 
scheme is more efficient than standard- setting regulatory approaches.  
However, in assessing whether to use marketable property rights, the 
government must consider the inefficiencies that emerge in 
administering property rights and the consequences of the lack of a 
perfectly competitive market.  Nevertheless, marketable property 
rights, in some circumstances, such as those involving low 
monitoring costs, can save billions of dollars compared to standard-
setting regulatory approaches.145
Another advantage of marketable property rights is the 
benefit created from continued technological innovation.  Firms also 
have an incentive to innovate because technological innovations can 
allow them to sell off or use their marketable property rights more 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
144 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 104; Ruud A. de Mooij, The Double 
Dividend of an Environmental Tax Reform, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 293, 302 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999) 
(noting the efficiency of market-based mechanisms through Coase’s theorem).  
145
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efficiently.146  Compare this to a standard, where once the firm meets 
the set standard, they have little incentive for further innovation.  
In the realm of code, the first notable creation of marketable 
property rights has been for the domain name system (DNS).147  In 
this case, the government supported the creation of additional 
domain names for greater consumer choice, lower prices, and better 
service.  To administer this process, the government turned over the 
management of the DNS to a private actor.148  However, the 
government has maintained oversight to ensure the system is not 
used strategically for the benefit of a few.149  This is necessary 
considering the persistent problems with the DNS privatization 
process.  In fact, the government has advocated creating more 
property and lowering the cost for consumers.150  The government’s 
efforts to date have been focused on creating property rights for 
greater consumer choice, not a regulatory mechanism.  However, one 
possible intervention is the government’s interest in creating new top 
level domains such as  .xxx, .adult, or .kids.151  This intervention is 
not about limiting behavior or allocating scarce resources, but is 
instead attempting to “fence off” or contain an activity to a specific 
146
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piece of property (more akin to zoning of real property than as an 
alternative for standard-setting regulation).
The second use of marketable property rights for code could 
be in the privacy area.  Scholars have argued that the creation of a 
property right in privacy could correct market failures by providing 
people with control over their personal information.152  The property 
right would lead to firms bargaining for a person’s information, 
rather than the current system in which the incentives are for firms to 
disclose information without consent.  However, it is not clear
whether this approach is warranted.  It appears that the creation of a 
privacy property right may not truly meet the needs of its proponents.  
The problem for most proponents is not the quantity of privacy, i.e., 
too much or too little.  Instead, the problem is the lack of negotiation 
and meaningful assent between parties during a transaction.153  This 
is not a problem that marketable property rights can address.  
Marketable property rights work best to limit a quantity of harm and 
are not helpful in facilitating informed negotiations.  Additionally, 
the purpose of property rights is to allow the market to allocate scare 
resources, and it is not clear how the market can allocate privacy 
property rights that are tied to individuals.  Furthermore, it is not 
clear how such a privacy property rights system will be 
administered.154  Finally, there is a moral objection to allowing 
people to buy and sell privacy.155  In sum, the creation of a 
marketable property right in privacy is not a suitable alternative to 
regulation.
D. Modifying Liability
Changes in liability doctrine are currently driving changes in 
the code.156  This section examines two different ways government 
152
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can use liability to shape code.  The first is through the law of torts, 
specifically product liability law.  The second is through the law of 
contracts.  We end by discussing how the relationship between 
increased liability and insurance companies can encourage the 
development of third party regulators, such as the Underwriters 
Laboratories, to shape code to address societal concerns.
1. Product Liability Law
Product liability law is governed by tort law and can affect 
the development of code.157  It depends not upon government 
agencies, but on persons who have been physically harmed and are 
seeking compensation in the courts.158  One function of product 
liability law is to encourage firms to improve the safety of their 
products.159  This section discusses how products liability law can 
serve as an alternative form of regulation to encourage the 
development of safer code.160
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Product liability law is a controversial area of the law.161  Its 
impact has varied considerably by industry.162  As of yet, product 
liability law has not had a substantial impact on code.163  This is not 
surprising considering that most losses from code are merely 
economic with no accompanying physical injury.164  Nevertheless, it 
is entirely foreseeable that as the use of code grows, it may 
increasingly be involved in physical injuries.  As a result, product 
liability will grow in importance and will begin to shape code.165
However, the broadening of product liability to code may not 
become fully obvious because code is often contained within the 
systems of larger products that have traditionally been subject to 
product liability, such as automobiles or medical devices.166
One prominent example of product liability law shaping a 
technology is Larsen v. General Motors Corp.167  General Motors 
argued that it had no duty to design an automobile that protects 
occupants in the event of a crash.  Crashing an automobile was 
outside its intended use.  However, the court disagreed.  It held that 
the manufacturer of a vehicle has a duty to design one with 
reasonable care.  This meant protecting occupants of the automobile 
Patricia Haney DiRuggiero, The Professionalism of Computer Practitioners:  A 
Case for Certification, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1139 (1991) (discussing 
government licensing versus an industry certification program).
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Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
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in the event of a crash, even though crashing is not the intended 
use.168
There are several objections to using products liability law to 
shape technologies.  First, critics argue that product liability law is 
inefficient.  They suggest that a more efficient method would be to 
allow consumers to select technologies based on their own 
evaluation of risk and safety concerns.  As the argument goes, this 
would encourage the market to develop a wide range of technologies 
that are responsive to consumer needs.  This would also save firms 
substantial litigation costs.169  Second, critics argue that the 
unpredictability of products liability law can lead to uneven results, 
since firms have difficulty predicting their liability exposure.170  The 
third objection is that product liability law has a chilling effect upon 
innovation.  In essence, the potential of product liability reduces 
innovation and keeps beneficial products off the market.171
While the market is theoretically more efficient, many of its 
assumptions are violated in the real world.  Product liability law can 
be more efficient than other alternatives, which are subject to market 
defects and transaction costs.  These defects can include buyers who 
are unaware of the risks or accorded inadequate opportunities to 
bargain for a safer and more expensive product.172  In the case of a 
complex product, where a buyer could not ascertain the risks 
adequately, scholars have argued that it may be best to place liability 
on the manufacturer because it could best weigh the associated 
costs.173  The threat of liability causes manufacturers to internalize 
social costs into their products, thereby increasing costs for the 
manufacturer.174  However, these costs produce safer products.  
Whether the costs of liability law are outweighed by its benefits is 
difficult to ascertain, because the deterrence aspect of product 
liability law provides a benefit to society that cannot be easily 
168
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measured.175  It is also difficult to account for what society gains 
from firms not releasing unsafe products.  There is considerable 
evidence that product liability laws have led to safer products.  For 
example, the change from a negligence standard to a strict liability 
standard has resulted in far fewer deadly accidents.176  Some even 
argue that if product liability laws were more stringent, we would 
have even safer products.177
Product liability law is typically unpredictable through its use 
of punitive damages, which often vary because they punish 
defendants for their conduct.178  In fact, in product liability cases in 
state and federal courts between 1965 and 1990, punitive damages 
were only awarded 355 times over the entire twenty-five year 
period!179  The purpose of punitive damages is twofold.  First, 
punitive damages express to defendants that their conduct is 
intolerable.180  Secondly, punitive damages serve as a deterrent 
because they reward plaintiffs subject to serious misconduct above 
their actual damages.181  As a result, punitive damages provide firms 
with a strong incentive to ensure their products meet society’s 
minimal standards for safety.  As a deterrent, there is evidence that 
punitive damages can result in safer products.182  Third, there is not a 
simple direct relationship between increased liability and decreased 
innovation.183  At high levels of liability, there is lower research and 
175
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development activity, and thus, less innovation.184  A degree of 
product liability risk creates an incentive to develop safer products, 
but at extremely high-risk levels, there is a reduction in the 
development of new products.  This leads to the conclusion that there 
is a balancing point between increasing safety and slowing of 
technological progress.185  Thus, a certain degree of liability can 
actually increase innovation.  Other research has found that 
innovation and safety can’t be separated; liability affects both.  In 
fact, liability promotes safety and innovation of desirable products, 
while also discouraging the development of unsafe products that may 
be innovative.186
One distinct advantage of product liability law is its public 
visibility.187  The publicity of a product liability lawsuit can serve to 
stimulate safety through a variety of societal institutions.188
Naturally, a products liability lawsuit will lead manufacturers to 
reexamine their practices.  Moreover, the publicity can also spurn 
regulatory agencies to action as well as leading to consumer demand 
for safety.189  Moreover, there is also evidence that product liability 
lawsuits provide firms with an incentive for developing safer 
products by affecting their wealth through the stock market.190
Product liability already plays a role in shaping the 
development of code.  In industries where defective code can cause 
physical injury, e.g., aerospace and medicine, developers strive to 
make safer code.  There are many reasons, besides purely regulatory 
concerns, why firms avoid developing unsafe code.  These include a 
loss of revenue and reputation, as well as product liability costs.  As 
a result, firms developing code for aerospace applications and 
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medical devices use a number of developmental strategies to ensure 
high quality code.191
Product liability can also play a role in shaping the future 
development of code.  One such potential application is to hold firms 
liable for failing to properly secure their computer systems.192  Firms 
that do not implement appropriate levels of security not only place 
themselves at risk, but may also serve as unwitting pawns in attacks 
on other computer systems.  Analysts have argued that one solution 
to this problem is the imposition of tort liability.193  Such liability 
would motivate firms into adopting more secure code and better 
security procedures.
2.  Contract Law
A second option for regulating with liability is by using 
contract law.  Typically a transaction involving code falls under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which has been virtually fully 
enacted by all fifty states.194  The UCC contains default rules for 
contracts, rules that govern all contracts, and default rules regarding 
warranties.195
Recently, there has been a movement to amend the UCC to 
better handle transactions with intellectual property and software.  
This was initially titled Article 2B.  However, sharp differences of 
opinion emerged from the drafting process.  Eventually, the 
American Law Institute withdrew from the process and eliminated 
Article 2B as an amendment to the UCC.  However, supporters of 
Article 2B renamed the legislation the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA).196  UCITA has since been 
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enacted in Virginia and Maryland and is being considered by other 
states.
UCITA is a contemporary example of how changes in 
liability affect code.  The pro-UCITA movement is being led by the 
software industry vendors and has led to two states adopting UCITA.  
However, a number of organizations have been fighting the adoption 
of UCITA.  This has led a few states to pass anti-UCITA legislation, 
bomb-shelter legislation, which protects their residents against 
licensing provisions in contracts governed by UCITA.197  Without 
addressing the merits of UCITA, we will highlight some provisions 
of UCITA and changes in contractual liability that could affect the 
development of code.  
UCITA allows developers to insulate themselves from 
liability for damages caused by software.198  According to Barbara 
Simons, “we know that it is almost impossible to write bug-free 
software, [b]ut UCITA will remove any legal incentives to develop 
trustworthy software, because there need be no liability.”199  As a 
result, many software industry insiders believe that UCITA will only 
lead to even lower quality standards for code.
A second criticism of UCITA is that it would create 
enforceable provisions against reverse engineering, the process of 
analyzing code to determine how it operates.  Reverse engineering is 
an accepted practice under copyright and trade secret law, and is 
usually for the purpose of duplication by competitors who wish to 
develop rival code. 200  However, UCITA allows firms to prohibit 
reverse engineering of products.  Undoubtedly, this provision will 
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make it more difficult to develop competing products.  While it may 
be difficult to enforce, this provision will still have an unsettling 
effect upon code development.201
 A third criticism of UCITA is that it allows developers to 
enforce contractual provisions against public criticisms of software, 
potentially affecting the writing of reviews, comparisons, and 
benchmark tests on code.  These writings serve to inform consumers 
and create a more competitive marketplace.202  While this provision 
may be found to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, it will 
still have a chilling effect upon the reviews of code.203
UCITA is an example of how changes in liability can shape 
code.  Although, it is highly questionable whether UCITA in its 
present form will be widely adopted, the fundamental concepts 
behind the creation of UCITA are very relevant.   In essence, UCITA 
is a balancing of various liabilities and conditions for the use of code 
between developers and consumers.  Whatever the outcome is, it will 
serve to shape the code developed in a post-UCITA world.
2. Insurance and Third Party Regulators
One consequence of liability is the development of 
institutions to lessen and spread the risk of liability.  Insurance has 
long been a mechanism to spread the risk of liability from events 
such as fire or earthquakes.204  Of even greater interest is how 
liability and insurance companies can foster the development of third 
party institutions to regulate products.  The archetype of this concept 
is the Underwriters Laboratories (UL), which conducts uniform 
testing of electrical appliances to assess their safety.  A similar, code-
based laboratory could be established to ensure that code meets 
various societal concerns.
In order to foster similar results, it is necessary to consider 
the factors that led to the growth of the Underwriters Laboratories 
(UL).  UL’s history began with a rash of electrical fires in major 
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American cities in the 1890s.205  This led a number of insurance 
companies, such as the Chicago Board of Fire Underwriters, Western 
Insurance Association, and the Electrical Bureau of the National 
Board of Fire Underwriters, to fund a testing laboratory.206  The 
laboratory became the UL and provided rigorous, unbiased, testing 
of electrical devices for fire prevention.207  Today, the UL works 
with over sixty thousand manufacturers with its label present on over 
one hundred thousand products, each evaluated for safety.208  The 
success of the UL is the result of a close relationship with insurance 
companies and government regulators.  This relationship ensures 
manufacturers follow UL’s safety standards.  As a result, consumers 
and manufacturers consider products bearing the UL label to be safe.  
As a result of recent concerns about security, the government 
is attempting to foster a similar system for code.209  Such a system 
begins with companies purchasing insurance for cyber security.  
Insurance companies provide discounts to firms with better security 
practices and those who use more reliable security products.  This 
would encourage the creation of an analogous UL for testing code.  
Ideally, this laboratory could work as efficiently as the UL and be 
able to test the vast amounts of code-based products in a timely 
manner.  Companies using these approved pieces of code would have 
their premiums reduced thereby increasing demand for more secure 
code and creating an incentive for developers to make sure their 
products met the standards of the code-based UL.
The aforementioned approach is very compelling.  It is 
largely based on private actors with government merely promoting 
and using the tested products.  The incentive structure for insurance 
companies, the insured, and developers appears to be very clear.  
While this scheme has proved successful for the UL and electrical 
products, there are significant issues with using insurance and third 
party regulators for code.  Consequently, our approach also addresses 
205 NORM BEZANE, THIS INVENTIVE CENTURY:  THE INCREDIBLE JOURNEY OF THE 
UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES 6 (1994).
206 Id. at 7.
207
 The UL asserts that it is “testing for public safety.  Our goal is to serve, not to 
profit.”  Id. at 6.  
208 Underwriters Laboratories, 2001 Annual Report, available at http://www.ul.
com/annualreport01/index.html (last visited July 23, 2002).
209
 Brian Krebs, White House Pushing Cybersecurity Insurance, WASH. POST, June 
27, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55719-
2002Jun27.html; Nancy Gohring, Cyberinsurance May Cover Damages of 
Computer Woes, SEATTLE TIMES, July 29, 2002.
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how to regulate code consisting of a large number of products that 
change rapidly.  
We believe that there are three issues the government must 
consider in trying to encourage the development of an insurance 
system for code.  First, insurance is not appropriate for potential 
losses where self-protection measures play an important role. 
Insurance works best in situations when its price is largely 
independent of expenditures on self-protection.210  For example, 
homeowners demand insurance against fire and earthquakes because 
these are events that are largely independent of self-protection 
measures.  Conversely, when the price of market insurance depends 
upon self-protection, there will be a small demand for market 
insurance and a large demand for self-protection measures.211
The importance of self-protection for Internet security lessens 
the need for insurance.  In the current state of the Internet, self-
protection measures play an important role in reducing losses.  This 
is evident in the vast industry devoted to developing and teaching 
self-protection skills to firms.212  As a result of the importance of 
self-protection, the natural inclinations of the market will not foster 
the development of market insurance for security.  Thus, 
government’s encouragement will not be enough to foster the 
development of an insurance system.
Without a viable insurance system, there is little incentive for 
insurance companies to encourage third party regulators for code.  
Moreover creating third party regulators, which are not backed by 
insurance companies or some other entity that can force compliance, 
is bound to fail.213  Absent the support of insurance companies and 
210
 Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self Insurance, and Self 
Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623, 642 (1972).
211
 Consider the following examples for code.  There is little a firm can do to 
protect itself from a major Internet outage.  However, a firm can protect itself from 
a minor Internet outage through the use of redundant Internet service providers.  
Therefore, one would expect a demand for insurance against losses from a major 
Internet outage, but not from a minor Internet outage.
212
 One exemplary program is the SANS (System Administration, Networking and 
Security) Institute, which is devoted to defending computer systems and networks 
against the most dangerous threats.  Information can be found at its web site, at 
http://www.sans.org/newlook/home.php.
213
 For example, a third party private regulator for privacy, TrustE, has largely 
failed.  This occurred because it has no enforcement authority or “stick” to ensure 
compliance.213  There were no laws holding actors accountable for privacy 
violations.  Therefore, TrustE could not meaningfully regulate violators’ activity.  
The use of private regulators such as TrustE has proven unsuccessful.  TrustE is 
ineffective because it cannot force parties to comply.  If a party does not comply 
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the subsequent threat of financial repercussions, there is little 
incentive for the growth of vigorous third party regulators for 
code.214
Another problem with insurance for code is the need for 
determinable damages.  If losses cannot be estimated by insurance 
companies, they cannot provide market insurance that is priced in 
accordance with the risk.215  The problem is that code-based damages 
are different than a loss from a fire or hazard, because damage from a 
fire is tangible, obvious, and irreplaceable.  Code in the form of 
software, in databases, and other similar media is often intangible.  
Moreover, it is not obvious what the losses actually are when many 
code-based losses are reversible.216  Examples of these are computer 
viruses, hacker attacks, and the defacement of web pages.  The 
remedy for many code-based security losses is that members of a 
firm’s staff must perform activities such as removing viruses from 
computers and restoring backups.  Therefore, predicting and 
assessing a firm’s damages is difficult.  Moreover, it may be that 
damages are so low that firms prefer to self-insure.
Yet another problem concerns the appropriate purchaser of 
insurance.  Throughout the government’s efforts to improve security, 
it has focused on insurance for firms who use the Internet in their 
daily business.  If its goal is developing more secure products, the 
government should focus on insurance for code developers, thereby 
addressing the problems of self-protection and determination of 
damages.  If these firms were subject to liability, then they and their 
insurers would have a tremendous incentive to address that liability, 
which could lead to several outcomes.217    The developers could 
with TrustE they lose slight reputation capital.  There is little liability at stake.  In 
contrast, not complying with standards set by Underwriters Laboratories can lead 
to problems in terms of lawsuits, loss of insurance coverage, and government 
oversight.  Thus there are very real penalties for violating or ignoring the standards 
promulgated by Underwriters Laboratories.  See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 26
(discussing the failure of third party institutions in regulating online privacy); Paul 
Boutin, Just How Trusty is Truste?, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,51624,00.html (noting the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism by TrustE).
214 See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 26 (calling for government participation to spur 
the growth of third party institutions to regulate firms).  
215 See Raz & Shaw, supra note 204.
216
 Krebs, supra note 209 (noting the problem with assessing damage).
217 Id. (noting that security expert Bruce Schneier believes that firms aren’t going 
to improve security until they face either product liability lawsuits or stringent 
standards).
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adopt voluntary “best practices” industry standards for security.218
Their insurers could then require them to adopt these new practices.  
Insurers could also encourage the development of a third party 
regulator to test products to ensure they are secure.  Finally, the 
industry could seek government regulation of code as a way to limit 
their liability.  All of these are ways that product liability and 
insurance can proactively shape code.
E. Requiring Disclosure 
The government can shape the development of code by 
requiring disclosure, thereby requiring firms to provide information 
about their products.  This differs from educational campaigns 
funded by the government, which we discuss later.219  Disclosure is 
intended to inform consumers, which then allows markets to work 
more efficiently.220  In many cases, the technical sophistication of 
code leads to few people understanding it.  As an example, most 
users didn’t understand the privacy risks of cookies until the media 
reported them.  Cookies are a technology that web sites can use to 
maintain information on their visitors.  Many people still don’t really 
understand how cookies operate and their privacy implications.221
As a result of their limited knowledge, many people are not able to 
protect their privacy, and consequently, their personal information is 
being collected.222  These privacy problems may be substantially 
reduced if firms are required to meaningfully disclose the privacy 
risks of cookies.
218
 Dan Verton, Tech Consortium Created to Improve Software Reliability, 
COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2002, available at http://www.computerworld.com/
securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,71297,00.html (noting that the insurance 
industry can aid in promoting “positive behavior” among developers).
219 See infra Part III.D.
220 BREYER, supra note 64, at 161.  Disclosure can also be used to outlaw particular 
conduct, for example requiring the disclosure of large currency transactions aids in 
finding violations of tax and drug laws.
221
 Similarly, people have difficult understanding the complex privacy policies put 
forth by web sites.  See Brian Krebs, Standard, Plain-English Privacy Policies 
Wanted – Update, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 3, 2001, available at http://
www.newsbytes.com/news/01/172628.html.
222
 Elinor Mills Abreu, CIA-Backed Web Privacy Firm Closes Service, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 20, 2001, available at http://www.washtech.com/news/software/ 
13778-1.html (noting that people don’t understand privacy issues on the Internet). 
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According to Justice Breyer, disclosure works most 
effectively when the following three conditions are met.223  First, the 
public has to be able to understand the information disclosed.  
Regulations are of no use if the information provided is too complex.  
Second, the public must have a choice within the market.  Disclosure 
is of no use if the public can’t select a different alternative.  Third, 
the public must find the information materially relevant.  If the 
public finds no value in the disclosure, there is little utility in 
requiring such disclosure.  Based on this analysis, we offer several 
potential approaches for government to regulate code with 
disclosure.  These include the use of disclosure to set product 
standards, disclosure for certain products or activities, and industry-
wide disclosure.
To provide the public with better information, the 
government can require firms to label their products with product 
standards.224  For such a label to be successful, it must be able to 
convey information in a meaningful and concise manner.  An 
example of a labeling standard is the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s standards for food quality.225  Another problem, 
unsolicited bulk email (spam), led the government to require the 
origin and the subject line of commercial email messages to not be 
deceptive.226  This disclosure ensures people are better informed 
about the source and content of commercial email messages.
Government can also mandate disclosure to ensure 
consumers are adequately informed.  This is a step beyond labeling 
and includes measures such as requiring firms to affirmatively 
provide information.  Indeed, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires public companies to disclose meaningful 
information, including financial information, to the public.  This 
inspired a California law, which required public disclosure of any 
computer security breaches in which the confidential information of 
a California resident may have been accessed.227  Another example 
of a code-based disclosure policy is the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act.  This law requires web sites to report what children’s 
223 BREYER, supra note 64, at 163-64.  See also WESLEY A. MAGAT, & W. KIP 
VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION (1992); SUSAN G. 
HADDEN, READ THE LABEL (1986).  
224 See supra text accompanying note 59.  
225 See supra note 60.
226
 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-127 (2004).
227
 Notice of Security Breach, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2004).
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information it collects, uses, and discloses, thus allowing parents to 
make an informed decision about what web sites their child should 
visit.228
A final method of disclosure is encouraging communication 
within an industry or to the government.  In some circumstances, the 
public can benefit when firms share information.  It is also in the 
interest of government to support such collaboration.  For instance, 
the government-supported CERT Coordination Center collaborates 
with industry to disclose all known security incidents.229  This 
communication benefits the public by allowing the developers of 
code to react quickly to potential security problems.230  However, 
there is a concern that this creates room for some firms to behave 
opportunistically.  Firms could also use these disclosure regulations 
to favor certain firms over others.   This places a burden on the 
government to ensure that these regulations are not used to create an 
uneven competitive playing field.  Other firms may even be 
deliberately left out of the communication loop.  The government 
can also encourage firms to disclose information.  In such an 
instance, proposed legislation would provide firms additional 
protection from disclosure of computer attacks to government law 
enforcement agencies.231 Although there is a concern that this 
protection is too broad and could lead to less public information on 
the behavior of firms, it would provide an incentive for firms to 
provide information to the government.  
F.  Need for a Comprehensive Regulatory Strategy
A coherent and comprehensive regulation strategy for code 
has been inadequately considered by policymakers.  The regulation 
of code is spread over a variety of agencies including the FAA, FCC, 
228
 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 6501 (2001).
229
 CERT Coordination Center was originally called the computer emergency re-
sponse team. See, Robert Lemos, U.S. Creates Cyberalert System, CNET 
NEWS.COM, (Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://news.com.com/2100-7348-
5148877.html.
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 Elizabeth Hurt, New Alliance Takes on Security:  CERT Teams Up with Trade 
Group to Raise Awareness of Information Security Risks, BUSINESS2.0, (Apr. 19, 
2001), available at http://www.business2.co.uk/articles/web/0,1653,15984,FF.html
(discussing the collaboration between industry and government in disclosing 
security issues).
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 Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act of 2001, S. 1456, 107th Cong. 
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FDA, FTC, and NHTSA.232  There are no guiding principles or 
rationales for this regulatory approach.  In contrast, the regulations 
for other areas, including automobile technology and biotechnology, 
have distinct rationales that guide the development of regulation.
Before the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
required the government to develop safety standards for automobiles, 
auto safety had been largely unregulated.233  Today, one agency, the 
NHTSA, is responsible for setting the safety standards that 
automobile manufacturers must meet.  In contrast, the regulation of 
biotechnology is not done by one federal agency, but instead relies 
upon a coordinated framework of federal agencies.  This approach 
was recommended in a report by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP).234  The OSTP found that the current 
laws in this area were largely adequate.  This led to two guidelines 
for the regulatory activity.  First, each agency would operate in an 
integrated and coordinated fashion with other agencies.  Second, the 
responsibility for a product’s use would lie with a single agency.  As 
a result, the USDA, EPA, and FDA are each responsible for different 
phases in the development of biotechnology products ranging from 
research in laboratories to products in the marketplace.235
We believe that the approach used in the regulation of 
biotechnology is appropriate for code, which also has many different 
uses and is created by a wide variety of parties.  This diversity would 
232
 The NHTSA is responsible for automobile safety and this now includes code.  
This is because computers are now used in motor vehicle systems such as pollution 
control, transmission, antilock brakes, electronic and mechanical systems, heating 
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components and software flaws have caused problems with air bag deployment, 
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cause enormous difficulties for one agency attempting to regulate all 
forms of code.  Instead, regulatory authority should be given based 
on product use to a single agency.236  We see a movement in this 
direction with recent concerns over security and the government's 
efforts in attempting to unify coordination of code-based security.237
Nevertheless, we believe government needs to expend more 
resources in developing a coordinated strategy for the regulation of 
code.238
III. SHAPING CODE THROUGH GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Government can encourage the development and use of 
socially beneficial code with its fiscal power as it does in supporting 
medical research, subsidizing agriculture, and building the interstate 
highway infrastructure.  This section discusses four different ways 
(summarized in Table 2) that government’s spending can influence 
the development of code.
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specific and not technology specific.  Timothy Wu, Application v. Internet - An 
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Table 2.  Fiscal methods for encouraging the development of code
A. Government Support of Research and Development
The government can support and shape the development of 
code by funding research and development activities intended to 
develop code.239  Society’s research and development spending on 
computers and electronics alone totaled thirty six billion dollars in 
2000.240  While the majority of this funding is from industry for 
industry, the federal government accounts for about six billion 
dollars spent on research and development for computers and 
electronics.241  In spending money on research and development, the 
federal government can use two distinct approaches.  We suggest 
that while government support of basic, knowledge-seeking research 
is essential for long-term innovation, we also believe that mission-
oriented funding can address and shape code that meets societal 
concerns.
In discussing government support of research and 
development, we wish to avoid the common distinction between 
basic and applied research.  Instead, we believe a better distinction is 
to view research as being basic, knowledge-seeking, or more 
mission-oriented.242  Thus, in discussing the funding of basic and 
mission-oriented research, we focus on the motivations of the 
research and not on the methods or outcomes.243  Accordingly, we 
239 See infra note 351 (noting an alternative to government funding of research and 
development is the use of a tax expenditure to subsidize research).
240 NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS – 2002 
(2002), at Table 4-3.
241 Id. at Table 4-31, 4-33.
242
 Lewis M. Branscomb, From Science Policy to Research Policy, in INVESTING IN 
INNOVATION 112, 129-33 (Lewis M. Branscomb & James H. Keller eds., 1998).
243
 All too often research is divided into basic and applied.  In this division, 
research with no clear application is basic research, while applied research is one 
with a practical application.  Research conducted in academic laboratories is basic 
research, while research conducted in industry laboratories is applied research.  
Theoretical work is basic research, while experimental work is applied research.  
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will use the terms basic research and mission-oriented research in our 
discussion.
1. Funding Basic Research
Basic research strives to understand how things work without 
having specific applications in mind.  This type of research has 
resulted in great innovations, including government funded basic 
research leading to the development of the Internet and the World 
Wide Web.  The rationale for such government funding is that the 
private sector will not perform an adequate amount of basic research.  
This market failure exists for a number of reasons.  First, firms 
cannot predict the future economic value of basic research.244  The 
core characteristic of basic research is that it is unknown what 
application it may serve.  Secondly, once the knowledge is produced, 
it is difficult to keep the knowledge from others.245  The benefits of 
funding research and development cannot be entirely captured by a 
firm.  Consequently, this leads rational-acting firms to concentrate 
Science is produced by basic research, while technology comes from applied 
research.  Moreover, implicit in this distinction is a linear model of development.  
This holds that basic research leads to applied research and that advances in 
science lead to advances in technology.  We believe these divisions between what 
is being studied, the methods, outcome, and resulting linear model are an 
anachronism and lead to a poor understanding of technological development.  
Relying on this conception of technological development does not allow us to 
understand the development of code, especially in relation to government support 
of code.  This is why more recent material ignores these divisions.  Id. at 120.  See 
also COMMITTEE ON CRITERIA FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT ON RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT, ALLOCATING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(1995), available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/fedfunds/
part1/determining.html.
244
 Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. 
POL. ECON. 297 (1959).  Nelson’s approach is referred to as the informational 
approach.  Today, most scholars don’t believe the knowledge produced is just 
information which can be easily transmitted.  Instead, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that information implicitly requires a capacity to use it in a 
meaningful way and gaining this capacity is not trivial.  This is referred to as the 
evolutionary economic approach.  See Ammon J. Salter & Ben R. Martin, The 
Economic Benefits of Publicly Funded Basic Research:  A Critical Review, 30 RES. 
POL'Y 509, 511 (2001).
245 Nelson, supra note 244.  See also COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FUNDING A 
REVOLUTION:  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (1999). 
(providing the economic rationale for government supported research and 
development).
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their resources on applied problems whose benefits are better 
captured by the firm.246
The problem of under-funding by the private sector led to 
calls for government funding.  The most celebrated and influential 
supporter of government funding was Vannevar Bush, who argued 
that researchers should be allowed to perform research without 
concerns about its practicality.247  He believed that curiosity-driven 
research eventually leads to technological innovation.  Therefore, if 
government wants to increase technological innovation, it should 
fund more basic research.248  This argument has been very persuasive 
and has resulted in substantial government funding for basic research 
and development.  In the field of computer science, the government 
spent almost $900 million on academic research in 1999.249
Historically, this emphasis on basic research has led to the 
development of many technological innovations of code.  Besides the 
development of the web, government’s support has been 
instrumental for a number of other important computer innovations 
such as timesharing, computer networking, workstations, computer 
graphics, the mouse, the windows interface, VLSI circuit design, 
RISC computing, parallel computing, and digital libraries.250  We 
have no doubt that additional basic research will lead to further 
innovations in the future, and this is why we support government 
funding of basic research.
A few critics argue that government funding of basic research 
is not needed.  For them, government funding is simply wasteful and 
unneeded.251  This position has been harshly criticized.252  For 
246 See Gregory Tassey, R&D Trends in the U.S. Economy:  Strategies and Policy 
Implications, NIST Briefing Note, Apr. 1999, available at http://www.nist.gov/
director/prog-ofc/R&DTrends.htm (providing additional arguments on why 
industry under invests in research and development).
247 VANNEVAR  BUSH, SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945).  
248
 Michael Crow & Barry Bozeman, R&D Laboratory Classification and Public 
Policy:  The Effects of Environmental Context on Laboratory Behavior, 16 RES. 
POL'Y 229 (1987) (finding that public institutions are best in carrying out basic 
research and development).
249 NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS – 2002 
(2002), at Table 5-9.
250 COMMITTEE TO STUDY HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING AND COMMUNI -
CATIONS, EVOLVING THE HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS 
INITIATIVE TO SUPPORT THE NATION'S INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 17-18 
(1995), available at http://www.nap.edu/ catalog/4948.html.
251 See TERENCE KEALEY, THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (1996) 
(criticizing government funding for research).
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example, Nelson found in a variety of industries that government 
support of research and development was valuable; even in industries 
with a high level of private research and development, there was a 
substantial role for government supported research and 
development.253
The criticisms of government funding are largely about what 
research to conduct.  In basic research, scientists, not society, decide 
what is important.  Yet, this research is funded by society who, quite 
rightly, wants to ensure that there are tangible, societal and economic 
benefits flowing from this research.  Moreover, society believes 
certain areas of research demand higher priority.  Recently, this has 
been manifested in a rapid increase for basic research in medicine, 
which has led to reduced funding in other areas such as energy and 
astronomy.254  Since the basic research model cannot address 
immediate societal problems, another model for funding research and 
development merits consideration.
2. Supporting Mission-Oriented Funding
The mission-oriented approach seeks to force the 
development of scientific knowledge and technologies through 
increased funding on specific subjects.255  This approach recognizes 
the need for basic research, but suggests that we must also prioritize 
and allocate resources based on societal concerns.  Though 
unconcerned with learning about the world merely for the sake of 
learning, this approach is concerned with problems that affect 
252 See Paul A. David, From Market Magic to Calypso Science Policy:  A Review 
of Terence Kealey’s The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 26 RES. POL’Y
229 (1997) (critiquing Kealey’s arguments). 
253
 Nelson, supra note 63.
254
 Dan Vergano, Medical Research Has Healthy Budget, USA TODAY, Mar. 20, 
2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2001-03-20-medical-
research.htm.  To protect against a pure politicization of research funding, agencies 
such as the NSF use peer review for the allocation of research funds. 
255
 This approach can be phrased as a Jeffersonian approach with an emphasis on 
both traditional basic and applied research.  See Gerald Holton & Gerhard Sonnert, 
A Vision of Jeffersonian Science, ISSUES SCI. & TECH, Fall 1999, available at 
http://www.nap.edu/issues/16.1/holton.htm; Lewis M. Branscomb, The False 
Dichotomy:  Scientific Creativity and Utility, ISSUES SCI. & TECH, Fall 1999, 
available at http://www.nap.edu/issues/16.1/branscomb.htm.  See also Michael 
Crow & Christopher Tucker, The American Research University System as 
America's de facto Technology Policy, 28 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 2 (2001) (arguing 
that such targeted research is the de facto policy in America, despite the rhetoric 
supporting Vannevar Bush’s ideas for government support of basic research).
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society.  We believe that the mission-oriented approach permits 
society to shape code to address specific societal concerns, such as 
privacy and security.
While we support the use of mission-oriented funding, we 
also recognize that without funding for basic research, this approach 
may lead to long-term problems.  History has shown that 
advancement in any field depends upon advances in other, seemingly 
irrelevant, fields.  For example, recent successes in medicine can be 
attributed to advances in high-energy physics, computing, and 
mathematics.256  Another caveat from our case studies, as well as the 
literature on innovation, shows that technological innovation is often 
unpredictable.257  As a result, the government may squander 
resources by paying too much for a solution or failing to develop a 
solution in its search for a technological solution.
There are two different mission-oriented approaches that the 
government can use to shape code.  The first approach is when the 
government is the predominant purchaser of a product, such as 
defense.  In this case, the government has a legitimate interest in 
shaping the technology.258  The government’s procurement interest 
allows it to define its technological needs based on its own 
expertise.259 Government funding for research and development 
allows government to meet its needs, because firms would not 
develop products because of the lack of a private market and the 
uncertainty of government procurement.  Although the mechanics of 
the actual funding may be a procurement contract, in essence, this 
approach is focused on increasing the supply of technologies with the 
government funding the research and development of these 
technologies.260  Critics argue that this approach is too expensive and 
wasteful.  In fact, there is ample evidence that some technology 
decisions made by the Department of Defense have been costly and 
wasteful.261  Such waste usually occurs because of both the politics 
256
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257 See supra note 65.
258
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259 Id.  
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and the sheer size of defense spending.262  However, this funding can
affect society broadly through spillover effects, which occur when 
the private sector finds a commercial application for a government 
supported technology.263  These spillover effects mitigate the 
inherent inefficiencies in government funding of research and 
development for products that it will later purchase.264
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
is an example of an agency that funds mission-oriented research and 
basic research for the Department of Defense.  Its achievements 
include the F-117 stealth fighter, the Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System, and precision guided munitions, all of which 
were used in Operation Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War of 
1990.265  DARPA’s achievements have spilled over beyond the 
military.  For example, DARPA’s funding of ARPANET, the 
precursor to the Internet, as well as the seed funding for the W3C are 
prominent examples of technology spillovers from defense to 
society.266
The second form of useful mission-oriented funding is 
pursued by government agencies with an agenda.  By an agenda we 
mean an agency is supporting research and development that 
advances its own well-defined purposes.267  It can then evaluate and 
selectively fund projects that further those interests.  This is an 
effective way of supporting research that directly addresses societal 
concerns.  A good example of such a government agency is the 
262
 William Hartung, Corporate Welfare for Weapons Makers:  The Hidden Costs
of Spending on Defense and Foreign Aid, available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa350.pdf (Aug. 12, 1999).
263 Id.
264 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL 
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R&D, in HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS 431, 447-48 (Keith Hartley & Todd 
Sandler eds., 1995) (finding a low rate of return for government research and 
development funding for defense).
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 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Technology Transition, Jan. 
1997, available at http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/transition.pdf (describing how 
various DARPA technologies have been incorporated into the military capabilities 
for U.S. forces).
266 See Charles Piller, Funding the Impossible a Specialty for DARPA, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 2001, available at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-
102801darpa.story; World Wide Web Consortium, DARPA Support of the Web, 
available at http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Prospectus/DARPA.html (last 
modified July 31, 2001).
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 Nelson, supra note 63, at 460.
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National Institute of Health, which supports research addressing 
specific diseases.  The criticism of this approach is the government’s 
“picking” of winners.  Critics argue that there is a market for this 
research, and therefore, government funding is unnecessary.  
Additionally, they insist that government funding essentially 
subsidizes a narrow class of winning firms that gain government 
support.268
We readily agree that government generally is no match for 
the market in picking winners.  However, we believe that in certain 
instances, government can positively shape the development of 
technologies.  Our support is limited to areas where there are 
government agencies with defined missions.  This ensures that there 
are solid criteria and goals for the funding decisions as well as public 
support and accountability.  Moreover, an agency with a strong 
mission is likely to have the expertise available to make such funding 
decisions.  Expertise, along with a funding policy that is based upon 
evaluation of competitive proposals by informed agency officials 
and/or peer review, should aid in preventing wasteful 
expenditures.269
Government itself could fund projects to advance the 
development of code to address societal concerns.  For example, 
security has now become a major concern for code.  It is well known 
that there are fundamental problems with key components of the 
Internet’s infrastructure.270  The federal government is expected to 
268
 Mission-oriented funding approaches can lead to politicians and not scientists 
picking technologies.  An example in medicine is when the government allocates 
resources for particular problems such as breast cancer or Parkinson’s disease. In 
1993, Congress set aside $77 million in new funding specifically for breast, 
ovarian, and other cancers.  This funding was outside the traditional method of 
using peer review to select the funding for what research to pursue.  This meant 
NIH was forced to cut funding in other areas such as colon cancer to make up the 
shortfall.  In 1997, Congress passed legislation authorizing $100 million for 
research on Parkinson’s disease.  See Sue Kirchhoff, Progress or Bust:  The Push 
to Double NIH’s Budget, CONG. Q., May 8, 1999, available at
http://ugsp.info.nih.gov/info_items/info22.htm.  There is also ample historical 
evidence of the government’s inadequacies in picking winners.  According to the 
old adage, legislators and government bureaucrats shouldn’t pick technologies, 
instead consumers should.  Id.
269 See Steven Kelman, The Pork Barrel Objection, AM. PROSPECT, Sep. 1, 1992, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/V3/11/kelman-s.html
(providing recommendations to prevent funding from turning into congressional 
pork barreling). 
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Protocol (BGP).
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drastically increase its spending on computer security to more than 
four billion dollars a year.271  This involves supporting further 
government research and development with federal agencies such as 
the NSF and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) that will trickle down to universities.272  However, there is 
not one government agency solely overseeing or coordinating code 
development.  Based on our analysis, we would recommend funding 
for an existing agency in which security issues related to code are 
part of its mission.273  Otherwise, it is unlikely to have the expertise 
to fund projects judiciously.274
Government funding should also consider its role in creating 
and participating in the development of standards because they are 
considered impure public goods and will be under-produced.275
271 Bush Gives $1.7 Billion Boost to Cybersecurity, SILICONVALLEY.COM, May 23, 
2002, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news
/332403.htm.
272 COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, supra note 156; 
Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Congress:  Tighten IT Security, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, 
Apr. 22, 2002, available at http://ww.nwfusion.com/news/2002/0422nist.html; 
Brian Krebs, Bush Signs $900 Million Cybersecurity Act, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 
2002 (noting the new increases in spending for cybersecurity); Florence Olsen, 
Universities Expand Their Anti-Cyberterrorism Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Jun. 25, 2002, available at http://chronicle.com/free/2002/06/2002062501t.htm 
(noting how universities are shifting research priorities because of new financing).
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 National Science Foundation, Program Announcement:  Trusted Computing, 
NSF-01-160, (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/
2001/nsf01160/nsf01160.html.  To further improve efficiency, the government 
should consider charging one agency, such as the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology with conducting research into code-based security issues.  This 
would also help to prevent duplicative research as well as losing research results 
between various agencies.  An even better focus would be to fund an agency that 
needs to procure more security conscious code for its mission.  This agency would 
have an interest in not only funding such research, but also in ensuring this 
research is transferred to the private sector.  P.A. Geroski, Procurement Policy as a 
Tool of Industrial Policy, INTER. REV. APPLIED ECON., June 1990, at 182, 189 
(noting value of users in the procurement process for the creation of innovative 
products).
275
 Goods like education and standards are impure public goods. These combine 
aspects of both public and private goods. Although they serve a private function, 
there are also public benefits associated with them. Impure public goods may be 
produced and distributed in the market or collectively through government. How 
they are produced is a societal choice of significant consequence.  
62
There are several different kinds of standards that the government 
can develop, including those promoting interconnection and 
interoperability as well as standards that benefit public health and 
safety.276 This includes work on the “Common Criteria”, a set of 
mandatory security standards for code used in national security 
systems.277  Funding this type of research is another way government 
can shape to code to meet societal concerns.
B. Procuring Code 
The government can use its power of procurement to develop 
or support particular code.278  Government’s procurement power can 
create or increase the market for a particular product.  This “power of 
the purse” focuses on the demand side of technology, in contrast to 
the supply-side policies discussed previously.  There is a long history 
of the use of procurement power from standardized clothing sizes 
during the Civil War to the U.S. Army’s giving credibility to generic 
drugs.279  This power follows from the immense amount of 
government expenditures.280
Cargill, supra note 100 (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
CONGRESS, GLOBAL STANDARDS:  BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 14 n.23 
(1992)).
276 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.  For example, in response to 
concerns over computer security, NIST is expanding its efforts in setting federal 
security standards.  Marsan, supra note 272.
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 Ellen Messmer, Sun Earns Certification for Trusted Solaris 8, NETWORK 
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This section suggests that the government’s procurement 
power can also be effective in shaping information technologies.281
As the largest single purchaser of code, the government will spend 
over fifty billion dollars on information technologies in 2003,282
including almost nine billion dollars spent by state and federal 
governments on prepackaged software in 2001.283  This makes up a 
small, but significant, part of the $800 billion market for information 
technologies in the United States in 2001.284  Such a large purchasing 
power can be used to influence the development of code by the 
private sector.285
The reasoning behind using government procurement to 
shape code is that new products take time to develop as innovators 
create and expand a market.  This process is risky and is usually 
characterized by slow growth.  But when government uses its 
FISCAL YEAR 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ (last 
visited Jun. 5, 2003).  Of this, more than $200 billion will be spent directly on 
procuring goods and services.  This amount involves goods and services and not 
civil service or military personnel salaries, grants, foreign aid, etc.  See Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS), Federal Procurement Report, at 
http://www.fpdc.gov/fpdc/FPR2000a.pdf (last visited June 5, 2002).  See also 
Schooner, supra note 278, n.7 at 631 (noting the limitations of this procurement 
data).
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Theory, in PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT AND INNOVATION (Charles 
Edquist et. al. eds., 2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 
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282 Bush Gives $1.7 Billion Boost to Cybersecurity, SILICONVALLEY.COM, May 23, 
2002, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/ 
332403.htm; Office of Management and Budget, Report on Information 
Technology Spending for the Federal Government, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/final53.xls (April 9, 2001) (providing 
2002 figures).
283 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Tables 1, 11, available at http://www.bea.doc. 
gov/bea/papers/tables.pdf (May 3, 2002), cited in David S. Evans & Bernard 
Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software:  A Solution 
in Search of a Problem, n. 51, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=313202 
(May 21, 2002).  The total sales of prepackaged software was seventy four billion 
dollars.
284 WORLD INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY SERVICES ALLIANCE, DIGITAL 
PLANET 2002:  THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY (2002).
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 Recently, the Consumer Project on Technology called for the government to 
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Competition Security in Software Markets, June 4, 2002, available at
http://www.cptech.org/at/ms/omb4jun02ms.html. 
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purchasing power, it creates a much larger market.  This grants 
producers economies of scale, lower unit costs, and lower risks, 
thereby leading to the incorporation of new technologies and lower 
prices for the public in a shorter time.286
There are two major rationales for government’s use of its 
procurement power to favor certain products.  The first is an 
efficiency rationale that government should spend its resources 
wisely.  This leads to a number of potential measures that the 
government can take, including buying goods in volume to save 
money.287  For instance, there are efforts to procure inexpensive 
products, such as generic medicines.288  Another measure could 
require government purchasers to consider the total cost of 
ownership instead of just the initial cost.  This second rationale takes 
into account the effect of externalities, which are costs or benefits not 
contained in the price of a product.  Government procurement has 
historically internalized environmental and other social 
externalities.289  This has meant that government affirmatively acted 
to ensure these externalities were accounted for in the purchase of 
products.  If government did not account for these externalities it was 
essentially saying externalities were not important by setting their 
price to zero.290  Hence, by accounting for externalities, the 
government strives to “set an example to the private sector, advance .  
.  . [specific societal] goals, and best serve the public interest.”291
There are three major criticisms with using government 
procurement to shape technologies.  The first is that it consists of an 
unnecessary meddling with the market.  Government should act as a 
passive consumer and not attempt to influence the actions of private 
industry.  The second criticism is that government “meddling” will 
286
 Ralph Nader, Shopping for Innovation:  Government as a Smart Consumer, 
AM. PROSPECT, Sep. 1, 1992, available at http://www.prospect.org/printer-
friendly/print/V3/11/nader-r.html. 
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it to negotiate volume purchase arrangements.  See General Services 
Administration, GSA Federal Supply Service, available at
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?contentOID=22892&contentT
ype=1005 (last modified Apr. 11, 2002).
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 Nader, supra note 286 (noting the role of the U.S. Army in establishing the 
credibility of generic drug products).
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be useless or may even partially backfire.292  Critics argue that 
government support of a particular technology may not have much 
influence on the development of a technology and can even retard 
use by the private sector.  The final objection is that the addition of 
such criteria leads to a more complicated procurement process, and 
therefore, raises administrative costs.
The government has a long and successful history of activism 
in shaping technologies that have no market, e.g., high technology 
weapons.  Similarly, it can influence the development of commercial, 
off-the-shelf products.293  The rationale here is that government must 
buy something, so why not buy products that offset certain 
externalities.  In doing so, government could set an example for 
private industry by purchasing certain products or technologies that it 
deems worthy.  While the government has used procurement policies 
for energy-efficient products since 1976,294 recently, the government 
has been active with environmentally friendly procurement 
measures, such as preferences for recycled products.295  Instead of 
focusing on whether the government should be an active consumer, 
we think critics should instead focus on whether this approach has 
been successful.  We do, however, agree that government 
procurement efforts can have a negligible impact on the market.  To 
address this concern, we suggest that government procurement 
efforts be focused.  Typically, this involves using government 
292
 Donald B. Marrow, Buying Green:  Government Procurement as an Instrument 
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293
 In certain circumstances government may intervene on the supply side of 
procurement to ensure competition and innovation among producers.  For example, 
the military has successfully utilized a number of strategies to ensure a viable 
military supplier community.  These strategies include awarding contracts to new 
firms as well as established ones, ensuring technical information was widely 
disseminated across industry, and the use of second sourcing.  However, these 
approaches seem most successful when limited to circumstances when government 
purchasing dominates in a specific market with few producers.  If government 
spending is not significant its policies will likely be ineffective in affecting 
suppliers.  Similarly, if there are a plethora of suppliers there is no need for the 
government use procurement strategies to create competition and innovation.  See 
Charles Edquist & Leiff Hommen, Government Technology Procurement and 
Innovation Theory, available at www.tema.liu.se/tema-t/sirp/pdf/322_1.pdf (1998) 
(discussing various procurement strategies the military uses).
294
 Exec. Order No. 11,912, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,825 (Apr. 13, 1976) (calling for 
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 Jennifer McCadney, The Green Society? Leveraging The Government’s Buying 
Powers to Create Markets for Recycled Products, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 135 (1999).  
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GREENER PUBLIC PURCHASING:  ISSUES AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS (2000).
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procurement to provide the early demand for a product using new 
technologies.296  It is at this crucial stage that government can most 
effectively shape the development of technologies for commercial 
use.297
Even in markets where government demand is influential, 
procurement efforts may fail.298  Consider the scenario of two goods 
that are substitutes, green and brown.  Government procurement of 
green goods would crowd out the availability of green goods to 
private industry.  This would lead to private industry procuring more 
brown goods as a substitute for green goods.  Thus, the net effect of 
the government’s and private industry’s actions would be 
offsetting.299  Moreover, this could be seen as negatively impacting 
the development of new products or technologies because 
government would be crowding out private purchasers of green 
goods.  However, this analysis is based on the assumption that the 
products are close substitutes.  Moreover, if marginal costs are 
decreasing, government intervention can lower the price for green 
goods for all consumers through economies of scale.  This analysis 
indicates that economies of scale are an important element in the 
success of government procurement for shaping technologies.300
Finally, we understand the criticisms that additional 
procurement policies would raise the cost of procurement and deter 
agencies from following these rules.  While procurement guidelines 
require agencies to purchase equipment that meets the EPA’s Energy 
296 MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 645-46
(1990).  Government can also serve as a positive force to improve technologies and 
the competitiveness of producers through the following actions.  The government 
can use stringent product specifications rather than just purchasing what domestic 
firms produce.  These product requirements should also consider international 
needs, as that is where future markets will lie.  Government also must not be afraid 
to procure competitively.  This provides domestic firms an incentive to innovate.
297
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Star requirements,301 agencies are also supposed to purchase 
products that rank in the top twenty-five percent for efficiency for 
product groups without Energy Star labels.302  One report suggests 
that there is a low level of compliance with these rules for a number 
of reasons including a lack of enforcement, no requirement to justify 
inefficient purchases, and agencies already having too many 
procurement requirements to consider.303  However, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that these issues could not be 
addressed, if needed.304
One example of the influence of procurement power is the 
government’s support of energy efficient computer equipment.  An 
Executive Order in 1993 mandated that computers purchased by 
federal agencies must meet the EPA’s Energy Star requirements.305
In 1999, it was estimated that the Energy Star requirements on 
computers and monitors saved over one billion dollars.306  Moreover, 
the entire Energy Star program for labeling consumer products has 
prevented emissions of 5.7 million metric tons of carbon equivalent 
and saved over two billion dollars on energy bills in 1999 alone.307
These savings are the result of a voluntary government standard 
supported by a procurement policy.  Furthermore, these results 
suggest that the EPA’s Energy Star labeling and the federal 
procurement guidelines have led the private sector to purchase 
energy efficient equipment.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
purchase of energy efficient products by the government has led 
private industry to shift consumption toward inefficient products.
Another contemporary example of the government’s 
procurement power is the requirement that the government comply 
with section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act.  The Act states that any 
federal purchases of computers, software, and electronic equipment 
301
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used to disseminate information, including telephones, copiers, and 
facsimile machines, must be accessible to persons with disabilities.308
This has prompted firms such as Microsoft, Macromedia, and Adobe 
to modify their products to ensure they are capable of producing 
accessible web sites and content.309  The above examples illustrate 
that the government values societal concerns such as reducing carbon 
emissions and ensuring that disabled people have access to 
information technologies.  In both of these examples, critics ask: 
what is the cost of administering these programs?  Moreover, what 
are the additional procurement costs to the government as a result of 
these requirements?  This is a much harder question.  First, there is 
no clear data on how much extra, if any, the government has spent.  
Unless this data showed that the government spent significantly more 
money, it would seem irrelevant.  This is because the government’s 
procurement decision takes into account various externalities and 
necessarily implies the government’s willingness to pay more.  The 
hope here is that government efforts will prompt others to also take 
into account these values, and perhaps make it economically 
attractive for them to do so.
The aforementioned analysis suggests several 
recommendations for government procurement decisions regarding 
code.  The efficiency rationale suggests that government should 
consider how to save money in making procurement decisions.  In 
keeping with this idea, the U.S. General Services Administration 
(GSA) already buys information technology products in volume.  
This approach is a reasonable way to save government resources.  
The efficiency rationale also suggests the government should 
consider standards for product quality as well as open standards that 
promote interoperability.  Both of these types of standards have the 
potential to reduce costs.  For example, recently the United Kingdom 
put forth a policy seeking to use open standards that promote 
interoperability while avoiding products that lock-in to proprietary 
code.310  To conclude, the efficiency rationale suggests that 
government should consider the total cost of ownership and not just 
308
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the initial purchase price when buying products.  This rationale could 
lead government to support open source code if there was evidence 
that its total cost of ownership was less than proprietary code.  
However, there is a need for more data on the costs of open source 
code as compared with proprietary code before government can 
justify its use of open source code on efficiency grounds.
In procuring custom-made code, not available off-the-shelf, 
the government should consider placing its source code in the public 
domain.311  While this is not current practice, there is no reason why 
the government cannot bargain for the source code in its contracts.312
Once government has access to the source code, duplication for the 
public costs nothing because the software component of source code 
is nonrivalrous.313 If the government built a building, it could not 
simultaneously keep its offices there while allowing the public to use 
this building.  However, software code is different, since it can be 
easily reproduced.314
The government may go farther by placing its source code in 
the public domain, thereby keeping parties with access to the source 
code from having to “reinvent the wheel.”  Critics would argue that 
this approach is wrong for two reasons.  First, access to the source 
code could allow hackers to gain control of vital systems.  We agree 
with this criticism and believe that the source code should not be 
placed into the public domain, if there are national security concerns; 
311
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e.g., it may not be appropriate for code governing military satellite 
communications to be accessible by anyone.  Nevertheless, there 
may be portions of the code that could be placed into the public 
domain for society’s benefit.  Secondly, critics argue that placing 
code into the public domain will result in the code just languishing 
there.  Instead, what is needed for further development is the ability 
for a party to have exclusive property rights.  While this may be true 
in some instances, we do not think this is true in very many cases.  
Rather, in the later section on the transfer of intellectual property 
rights to the private sector, we argue that property rights are not 
necessarily required for further improvement of code.315
Government procurement decisions regarding code could also 
consider certain externalities such as the support of innovation, 
protection of privacy, and ensuring security.  The government could 
use its procurement decisions to favor certain products.  In the case 
of innovation, the government can ensure that the products it buys 
support open standards and modularity, keys to code innovation.  In 
the case of security, the government could ensure its products meet 
standards for security, such as the Common Criteria.316  These 
decisions may be more costly, but can benefit the public in ways that 
that the market does not capture.
Relying on the efficiency and externalities rationales has led 
to proposals that government use its procurement power to adopt 
open source code instead of commercial, off-the-shelf products.317
315 See infra Part III.D.
316 See supra note 277.
317 See ROBERT W. HAHN, GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE (2002), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/
authorpdfs/page.php?id=210 (providing several articles on possible approaches 
toward open source procurement by government).  See also President Information 
Technology Advisory Committee, Developing Open Source Software to Advance 
High End Computing, Oct. 2000, available at http://www.ccic.gov/ac/
letters/pitac_ltr_sep11.html  (encouraging the U.S. Government to use open source 
software in high end computing); Mitch Stoltz, The Case for Government 
Promotion of Open Source Software, NETACTION, available at
http://www.netaction.org/opensrc/oss-whole.html  (last visited Jan. 28, 2002); 
Shawn W. Potter, Opening Up to Open Source, 6 RICHMOND J. L. & TECH. 24 
(2000) (arguing that besides procurement, the government needs to amend the 
UCC to enhance adoption of open source); Should Public Policy Support Open-
Source Software?, AM. PROSPECT, available at http://www.prospect.org/
controversy/open_source/ (organizing a debate on this issue); David Bollier, The 
Power of Openness:  Why Citizens, Education, Government and Business Should 
Care About the Coming Revolution in Open Source Code Software:  A Critique 
and a Proposal for The H20 Project, available at http://www.openresources.com/ 
documents/power-openness/main.html (Mar. 10, 1999) (suggesting the use of 
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From an efficiency standpoint, it is well-established that the quality 
of open source code, such as Apache, can be comparable to that 
produced by private firms.318  However, the cost of open source code 
is significantly lower, especially when the nonrivalrous nature of 
open source code is considered.319
From an externalities standpoint, there are several reasons for 
the government to prefer open source code over proprietary code.  
First, government use of open source code can lead to public benefits 
through free access to this code.  For example, once the government 
develops or purchases open source code for one agency, department, 
or school, it can then be used by the rest of government for free.  
Additionally, this code can be freely adopted by the general public 
and would serve as an infrastructure others could use and build upon.  
A second externality to consider is the more innovative nature of 
open source code resulting from the fewer restrictions on its use as 
compared to proprietary code.320  Third, the open source movement’s 
government spending to support open source code).  Contra David S. Evans & 
Bernard Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software:  A 
Solution in Search of a Problem, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=313202 
(May 21, 2002); Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for 
Open Source?  Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319081 (last modified Nov. 
2002) (arguing that government should generally not favor open source software 
over commercial software).
318 See A. Mockus et al., A Case Study of Open Source Software Development:  
The Apache Server, PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 263, 265 (2000), available at http://www.bell-
labs.com/user/audris/papers/apache.pdf.  Another popular example is the Linux 
operating system.  It is considered more secure and bug free than code produced by 
Microsoft.  The explanation is that the open source movement’s public review 
process is much better and faster than that used by firms.  However, the claim of 
the open source movement’s high quality code is backed more by anecdotal 
evidence that empirical research.
319
 From an efficiency standpoint, open source code can also lead to less red tape 
because of the lack of licensing requirements that typically govern proprietary 
code.  For example, there is no need to worry about whether there is a license for 
code running on each computer.  This is a real concern for those who use 
proprietary software.
320
 Steven Mann extends this idea by arguing that government should not let itself 
be subject to any proprietary code.  Instead the government should only support 
code that is open.  The rationale is that government should create and use an 
electronic architecture that is available to everyone.  For example, he suggests that 
all publicly funded institutions be required to use file formats and standards that 
are in the public domain.  Steve Mann, Free Source as Free Thought:  Architecting 
Free Standards, FIRST MONDAY, Jan. 2000, available at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_1/mann/.
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public development process allows for a plurality of influences 
because it is not dominated by any one firm or country.321  Finally, 
open source code is transparent.  This allows government and society 
to easily examine code.322
The "political" property of code is analogous to the 
transparency we require in government legislation.323  For example, 
transparency in filtering software allows the public to determine the 
rules for excluding sites.324  Already, governments such as China, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are 
beginning to adopt open source code.325  For example, the ministries 
of culture, defense, and education in France are switching to Linux 
from Microsoft, Sun, and Lotus.326  Their reasons are that open 
source code is politically palatable, technically superior, and cheaper.  
The political reasons include concerns about the influence of the 
United States on their domestic software industry, national pride, and 
the well-known security flaws in Microsoft’s products.  The 
objections to this proposal are largely that government is interfering 
321
 The public development process can lead to new features that support societal 
values, which may not be present in commercial code.  This includes values such 
as privacy, security, and support for multiple languages, which are all in the 
interest of government to promote.  
322
 Transparency ensures the law of cyberspace is open to public examination. 
LESSIG, supra note 1, at 224.
323
 The public’s expectations regarding transparency are also supported by the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Sunshine Act. The FOIA provides for 
a general right to examine government documents.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).  The 
Sunshine Act strives to provide the public with information on the decision-
making processes of federal agencies.  5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994).
324
 Benjamin Edelman is seeking a declaratory judgment that will allow him to 
decrypt and publish portions of N2H2’s list of blocked sites.  By viewing the list, 
the public can determine what content N2H2 blocks.  Edelman argues that this 
information is important, because it allows the public to evaluate N2H2’s 
effectiveness in blocking content.  See Ross Kerber, ACLU Sues Firm Over 
Filtering Software, B. GLOBE, July 26, 2002, available at
http://www.globe.com/dailyglobe2/207/business/ACLU_sues_firm_over_its_filteri
ng_software+.shtml; Benjamin Edelman, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. - Case Summary 
& Documents, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/edelman-
v-n2h2/ (last modified Jul. 30, 2002).
325
 Paul Festa, Governments Push Open-Source Software, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 
29, 2001, available at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-6996393.html; 
Office of Government Commerce, supra note 310; Evans & Reddy, supra note 317
(providing a good summary of various governmental efforts in promoting open 
source code); Steve Lohr, An Alternative to Microsoft Gains Support in High 
Places, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/09/05/technology/05CODE.html.
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 Krane, supra note 325.
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in private markets and that government is taking money away from 
private industry.  The criticisms are both legitimate, but society is 
better off if this code is freely provided than by purchasing the code.  
By providing this code, the government is creating an infrastructure 
that others can build upon, thereby creating new innovative forms of 
code.  In the end, the government’s effort will create more innovative 
applications, instead of perhaps wasting money on duplicative code.
C. Using Tax Expenditures
The government’s power of taxation is another tool for 
shaping code.  In using its power of taxation, government can reduce 
or increase an individual’s or firm’s tax burden to create incentives 
for certain behavior.  This section discusses how a reduction of the 
tax burden through tax expenditures can induce certain behavior 
thereby allowing the government to both support the development of 
code generally and shape code in a particular fashion.
The government can reduce the tax liability for individuals or 
firms to encourage an activity or use of a product.  This reduction in 
tax liability is effectively a substitute for government spending and is 
termed a tax expenditure.327  The term tax expenditure highlights that 
the loss of tax revenue is equivalent to government spending.328  Tax 
expenditures are commonly thought of as tax incentives or 
loopholes.329  They serve many purposes, but are a popular method 
for addressing societal concerns.330
327 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985) 
(providing the authoritative work on tax expenditures).  See also TAX INSTITUTE OF 
AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971) (providing a number of articles on tax 
expenditures); Eric J. Toder, Tax Incentives for Social Policy:  The Only Game in 
Town?, Burns Academy of Leadership, University of Maryland, available at 
http://www.academy.umd.edu/scholarship/DLS/WorkingPapers/Toder.pdf (last 
visited Jun. 28, 2002); Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – Does it Make a 
Difference?, Urban Institute, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
research/author.cfm?PubID=410261 (June 8, 2000).
328
 Tax incentives can lead to a great deal of lost tax revenue.  For example, the tax 
expenditures for energy conservation and alternative fuels to mitigate global 
warming were estimated as $10.6 billion between 1998 to 2002.  This is three 
times as much as budgeted federal spending on addressing climate change. Chris 
Edwards et al., supra note 125, at 467 (noting that funding for the Climate Change 
Technology Initiative was about $3.5 billion between 1998 to 2002).
329 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 1.
330 See Eric J. Toder, The Changing Composition of Tax Incentives:  1980-99, 
National Tax Association Proceedings, available at http://www.urban.org/tax/ 
austin/austin_toder.html (Mar. 1999) (documenting that tax expenditures have 
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The use of tax expenditures to shape code is analogous to 
direct spending by the federal government.  It follows that the same 
justification for using a tax expenditure also supports the 
establishment of a direct funded government program.331
Commonly, this justification of government intervention is based on 
a form of market failure.  Different reasons exist as to why 
government may choose to use tax expenditures instead of direct 
spending to shape code for a particular purpose.  First, there are 
jurisdictional differences between tax expenditures and direct 
spending.  This refers to differences in the responsibility over the 
measure within the executive branch.332  When government uses a 
tax expenditure, the responsibility falls to the Treasury Department 
and the Internal Revenue Service for its administration.333  In 
contrast, direct spending requires an agency within the executive 
branch to administer the program.  This suggests that tax 
expenditures are best used when the administrative costs of 
establishing and maintaining a spending program are high.334
Additionally, administration of a program by the Treasury and IRS 
usually results in strict eligibility requirements because they tend to 
limit deductions.335  Moreover, the Treasury and IRS usually do not 
have the expertise or the interest in the effectiveness of the 
program.336  Therefore, a tax expenditure is appropriate when a 
program does not require continued administrative oversight and 
discretion.337
increasingly been used to promote social policy goals instead of business 
investment).  The total tax expenditures for fiscal year 2002 will be over six 
hundred billion dollars.  See Office of Management and Budget, Table 22-4. Tax 
Expenditures by Function, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2002/bud22_4.html (last visited Jun. 27, 2002).
331 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 112.
332
 There are also jurisdictional differences in Congress.  Legislators with little 
expertise on the issue at hand often write tax expenditure provisions, because they 
sit on the tax writing committee rather than the committee dedicated to the issue.  
See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 106-07.
333 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 106.
334
 Edwards, supra note 328, at 476.
335 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 106.
336 Id.
337
 One of the problems with the use of tax expenditures is that they may turn into 
tax shelters and lose their initial intent by subsidizing middlemen.  In the 1970s 
many tax shelters were used by well off persons and not their intended recipients, 
because investment professionals used techniques such as partnerships to gain tax 
advantages.  In contrast, a direct grant program by an agency can ensure that funds 
go directly to the intended recipients.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 327, at 
105.
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Another reason for government’s choice of tax expenditures 
is that using them produces psychological and political benefits.  In 
contrast to a direct spending program, a tax expenditure has much 
lower visibility.338  It is not represented by a government agency, 
rather it is hidden in the tax code.  A tax expenditure is not viewed as 
government rewarding a few firms, but is instead seen as 
encouraging private decision-making.339  As a result, many 
politicians who regard themselves as fiscally conservative would 
rather use a tax expenditure than support another “big government 
spending program”.  This is a key component to the popularity of tax 
expenditures.340  Nevertheless, a tax expenditure is still government 
spending.  Essentially, virtually any tax expenditure provision could 
be rewritten as a direct spending program.341
There are several objections to using tax expenditures.  First, 
critics argue that tax expenditures are not equitable.  They are of 
little use to firms or individuals with low tax liability.  A related 
objection is that the benefits of tax expenditures unfairly go to those 
with the highest tax liability.342  For individuals and firms with little 
tax liability or firms subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), a 
tax expenditure would be of no value.  However, in these cases, 
legislators can utilize a refundable, taxable credit, which is 
effectively a direct grant.343  Thus, this type of tax expenditure does 
not discriminate against those with little tax liability.  Secondly, the 
benefits of tax expenditures accrue to those with the highest tax 
liability.344  In some cases, this can serve as a stimulus to change 
practices to gain the full benefit of the tax expenditure.  If it is 
considered unfair that some beneficiaries with high tax liability are 
reaping the lion’s share of the benefits, the tax expenditure program 
can be limited.  Limits still provide incentives for behavior, but allow 
the government to ensure that a few taxpayers are not unjustly 
rewarded.  An additional objection is that tax expenditures are not 
338 Id. at 104-05.
339 Id. at 100.
340 See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE:  TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (documenting 
how four major tax expenditures, including the home mortgage interest deduction 
and the work opportunity credit are the result of political forces that differ from 
forces supporting direct spending programs).
341 Id. at 105.
342 Id. at 71-72 (noting that tax expenditures disproportionately favor those with 
high incomes).
343 Id. at 109-11.
344 Id. at 71-82 (noting that tax expenditures favored those with high incomes).
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efficient, but rather merely reward behavior that would have resulted 
anyway.  Therefore, tax expenditures produce a windfall.345  This 
objection also targets direct spending, which is the alternative to a 
tax expenditure.  However, it is possible to limit the windfall by 
making the tax expenditure incremental in structure.  For example, 
by requiring that a taxpayer’s activities exceed that of previous years 
to prevent a windfall, only marginal improvements would be 
rewarded.346  Critics also object that further tax expenditures will 
place too high of an administrative burden on the IRS.347  This seems 
unlikely given that the IRS already handles hundreds of billions of 
dollars in tax expenditures involving numerous subjects such as 
energy, natural resources, agriculture, housing, and transportation 
etc. . ..348  Moreover, instead of creating a new agency or department 
for a direct spending program, tax expenditures are likely to result in 
lower overall administrative costs by placing the burden on the IRS 
which already administers tax policy. 
The final objection is that the tax code should not be used for 
social policy even when supporting technological development.  
Instead, the government should look toward direct funding.349  Stated 
another way, the tax code focuses on raising revenue and not on 
social policy.  These incentives are likely to further complicate the 
tax code and lead people to lose faith in it.  While this argument is 
valid, the reality is that the tax code has long been an instrument of 
social policy.  Moreover, society supports this approach.350  In fact, 
345 Id. at 102.
346 Id.
347
 Edwards, supra note 328, at 476.  But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and 
Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975-76 
(1986) (arguing that tax expenditures can be more efficient than direct government 
spending because of lower transactional costs); Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to 
the Theory of Tax Expenditures:  The Case of Charitable Giving, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 99 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) 
(arguing that in some cases a tax subsidy provides society with a better outcome 
than direct spending).
348 See supra note 330 (providing a more complete listing of all tax expenditures).
349
 This is not new.  See Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of 
Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1965) (arguing that we need to question some of 
the favorable tax incentives given to encourage the development of technologies 
and ask whether they are needed or whether they are better off being direct 
subsidies).
350
 While tax scholars do not like the tax system used for social policy, economists 
see tax policy as an effective method to address societal concerns.  Taxes are seen 
as a way to address externalities.  See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to 
Incoherence:  Congress, Economics and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685 (2002).  See 
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according to Zelinsky, tax expenditures are a better way of 
communicating social policy to middle-income individuals and small 
businesses than direct spending.  This is true because the existing 
information networks of tax professionals will communicate 
information regarding tax expenditure.351  In contrast, the transaction 
costs are high for individuals and firms who try to find and utilize 
direct spending programs set up by the government.
Tax expenditures have long been used to support 
technological development, e.g., tax credits for research and 
development as well as proposed legislation to provide tax credit for 
the acquisition of information technologies.352  Other tax credits 
attempt to shape specific technologies.  For example, tax 
expenditures support alternative fuels, hazardous waste facilities, 
electric vehicles, and even research and development activities.353
Consider the Orphan Drug Act, which seeks to stimulate the research 
and development of drugs for rare diseases through both tax 
expenditures and direct research grants.354  This intervention is 
justified because rare diseases are seen as unprofitable by the 
pharmaceutical industry; therefore, industry requires an incentive for 
research and development.355  Moreover, direct grants are used to 
fund clinical testing programs for orphan drugs.  The FDA 
administers this program.  In contrast, the tax expenditures allow a 
tax credit equal to fifty percent of the qualified clinical testing 
expenses for the taxable year.356  However, the drug must first be 
generally A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 164 (1912); F.P. Ramsey, A 
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). 
351
 Zelinsky, supra note 347, at 1036.
352
 The government’s Research and Experimentation Tax Credit is one example of 
this.  It costs the government billions of dollars, but subsidizes research and 
development by firms.  See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDITS (1995). 
Kenneth C. Whang, Fixing the Research Credit, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 
1998, available at http://www.nap.edu/issues/15.2/whang.htm.  Senator Lieberman 
has proposed this tax credit as a stimulus for the economy.  See Joe Lieberman, 
U.S. Needs Policies That Encourage Tech Investment, MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 6, 
2002, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/4456934.htm.
353 See Internal Revenue Service, Qualified Electric Vehicle Credit, Form 8834 
(providing a tax credit to purchasers of electric vehicles).
354
 Orphan Drug Act of 1985, Pub. L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (2001).  For more 
information see the FDA page at http://www.fda.gov/orphan/index.htm.
355
 Andrew Duffy, Rare Diseases’ Troubling Questions, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 
2002 (discussing legislative activity in the United States and Canada on providing 
incentives for research and development into rare diseases).
356
 Orphan Drug Act of 1985, Pub. L. 97-414.
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designated as an orphan drug by the FDA.357 Here, the tax 
expenditure requires a modest amount of cooperation between the 
applicable federal agency with the expertise, the FDA, and the 
Treasury department to meet the goal of stimulating research.
The government could use tax expenditures to shape the 
development of code.358  For example, government could encourage 
the development of code to protect minors online, e.g., filtering 
software, which prevents minors from gaining access to 
inappropriate content.  Government intervention into this market is 
justified because the current products, including PICS, are expensive, 
difficult to use, and not very effective.359  Moreover, there is a 
demand by parents for a code-based solution to the problem of 
minors gaining access to indecent material.  
The justification for tax expenditures over a direct spending 
program rests largely on three reasons.  First, tax expenditures would 
not appear to be interfering in the market for the current products.  
Moreover, the problems of favoritism and picking “winners” for 
direct funding could be avoided.  Second, the administrative cost for 
this program would be modest, as there are only a few firms that 
would be eligible for this expenditure.  Finally, tax expenditures are 
much more politically palatable because they are not viewed as tax 
and spend.  The consequences of this proposal would be subsidizing 
vendors.  This could overcome the current stalemate, where parents 
don’t buy the code because it’s overpriced, and developers cannot 
357
 Orphan Drug Regulations, 21 C.F.R. PART § 316.20.
358
 Another proposal calls for tax expenditures or direct funding for firms and 
public organizations that manage key parts of the Internet known as Domain Name 
System (DNS) servers.  Currently, these are operated as free services.  Government 
funding would provide an incentive to improve the security of such systems.  Such 
an incentive is needed because of the poor state of security and the threat of attacks 
on the DNS servers.  See Paul Roberts, Major Net Backbone Attack Could Be First 
of Many, IDG NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 23, 2002.
359
 Larry Buchanan, Surfing in Shark-Infested Waters:  Filtering Access to the 
Internet, MULTIMEDIA SCH., March 1996, available at 
http://www.infotoday.com/MMSchools/MarMMS/networks3.html (noting the high 
prices of filtering software); COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNICAL, BUSINESS, AND LEGAL 
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PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 36-47 (2002) (providing a critique of the 
effectiveness of existing filtering software products); Leslie Gornstein, Locking 
Kids Out:  Web Filters, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sep. 27, 1998, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=safe&date=19980927 (quoting Family PC’s 
editor Joe Panepinto, “(Filters) are difficult to use, relatively expensive to maintain 
and difficult to configure”).
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earn enough revenue to improve their code, because of their low 
acceptance.  Thus, tax expenditures could lead to a reduction in cost 
for users while providing financial incentives for developers to 
improve their products.360
D. Funding Education and Training
The purpose of government funding can vary from providing 
information about an activity or product to proactively attempting to 
change behavior.  Such intervention is justified because of the lack of 
information on the part of the general public.361  In this section, we 
show how educational campaigns can shape code.  After discussing 
the criticisms of funding educational campaigns, we show how 
government can shape code through educational campaigns.  We 
focus on two such campaigns.  The first type of campaign is a by-
product of government’s employee training, while the second 
approach involves direct funding of educational campaigns.
Criticism of government funded educational campaigns 
largely centers on the effectiveness of these programs.  Critics argue 
that millions of dollars are spent on educational programs that 
provide no tangible benefits.362  One notable article on educational 
campaigns identified three problems with their effectiveness.  First, 
not all behaviors can be corrected by educational campaigns.  “Given 
human frailties, some accidents simply cannot be prevented.”363
360
 Another example of the use of tax expenditure to support code is to encourage 
the adoption of computers by individuals.  Instead of operating a direct funded 
program to provide people with computers, the government could opt for a 
refundable tax credit.  However, for tax expenditure to operate properly and to 
prevent fraud, it must be simple for the IRS and Treasury to administer the 
program.  In this case, the IRS could limit the deduction to new computers 
purchased from merchants registered as computer sellers with the IRS.  Although 
this would limit fraud, it would also not allow the purchase of computers from 
garage sales or eBay whose prices would be lower.  The tax expenditure would 
likely be a refundable tax credit to ensure that taxpayers with low tax liability can 
take advantage of this provision.  
361
 For example, the European Union partially funds the Internet Content Rating 
Association, which is educating parents and web sites about using content filtering 
technology, such as PICS.  Internet Content Rating Association, Internet Industry 
Leaders Gather for Launch of ICRAfilter, (Mar. 21, 2002) available at 
http://www.icra.org/press/p19.shtml.
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 Robert S. Alder & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command:  Are Education 
Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation, 1 YALE J. REG. 159, 192 
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363 Id. at 191.
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Second, campaigns should focus on one-time actions instead of 
trying to alter patterns of behavior.  Third, changes come “slowly, 
modestly, and often expensively.”  While these criticisms are valid, 
newer and more sophisticated approaches to educational campaigns 
have been shown to be more effective.
One way to raise the effectiveness of a campaign is to make it 
less costly.  An example of this is the use of educational campaigns 
that are by-products of the government’s efforts to educate its own 
employees.364  This occurs because of the ease of diffusing 
information through the Internet, essentially a low-cost educational 
campaign.  An excellent example of this is the web site usability.gov.  
Its original purpose was to assist people working with the National 
Cancer Institute’s (NCI) web pages, which provided a methodology 
for how to improve the design of web sites based on NCI’s 
experience.  NCI recognized that its web site was useful to people 
outside of NCI and proceeded to make it available to both other 
federal agencies and the general public.  The cost of making this 
information available to others via the Internet was extremely low.  
As a result, usability.gov is now an important resource for web 
designers on how to make web sites more usable, useful, and 
accessible.  This example shows how effective educational 
campaigns can flow from the government’s efforts to educate its 
employees.365
The effectiveness of educational campaigns can vary depending upon 
whether the government is seeking to merely inform consumers 
about risks or attempting to change the behavior of people.366  While 
informing consumers is a straightforward process, changing behavior 
is much more difficult.  After all, firms have long tried to persuade 
consumers to purchase their products with mixed success.  
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that educational campaigns 
can in fact change behavior where other forms of regulation would 
fail.367  Today’s educational campaigns use much more sophisticated 
364
 For example, the government strives to ensure that its employees consider 
energy efficiency through educational campaigns.  ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY 
AND FEDERAL ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY TASK FORCE, supra note 303, at 31-34.
365 See http://usability.gov; Sanjay Koyani, The Story Behind Usability.gov,
available at http://www.boxesandarrows.com/archives/002319.php (Apr. 1, 2002) 
(providing a history of usability.gov); William Matthews, Dot-gov by Design, FED. 
COMPUTER WK., Dec. 10, 2001 (discussing how usability.gov helps to improve 
government web sites).
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marketing techniques.  The same principles and practices firms used 
for marketing are now being adapted to bring about social change, 
such as public health or safety.  This approach is aptly named social 
marketing.  It has been applied to a variety of social issues including 
health, education, safety, and the environment.368  Despite these new 
tools, the effectiveness of social marketing depends on the problem it 
is trying to solve.  Clearly, changing fundamental behaviors, 
attitudes, and values is much more difficult than altering a single 
behavior.  Nevertheless, in some cases, social marketing has proven 
successful in changing behavior.369
The government currently operates educational campaigns for 
code which provide information to help with consumer decisions.370
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains information for 
consumers on e-commerce and the Internet.  This includes 
information on buying low cost computers, protecting minors online, 
and the many types of online scams.371  One notable example is the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of fake web sites to teach 
investors about potential scams.372  The fake web sites promoted 
financial opportunities with the potential for tremendous financial 
gains.  But once an investor tries to invest, they are led to a page that 
says, “[i]f you responded to an investment idea like this … you could 
get scammed!"373  The page also provides further information how to 
research investment offers and what to do if you are scammed.  
Another example of an educational campaign is the Energy Star 
specifications that allow consumers to identify energy-efficient 
368 Id. at 6.
369 Id. at 8-10 (noting the success of the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention 
Program and Sweden’s campaign to change the rules of the road).  A few other 
examples that Kotler and Roberto cite are as follows:  M. T. O’Keefe, The Anti-
Smoking Commercials:  A Study of Television’s Impact on Behavior, 35 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 242 (1972 (smoking); Harold Mendelsohn, Some Reasons Why 
Information Campaigns Can Succeed, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 50 (1973) (drinking); 
R. I. Evans, Planning Public Service Advertising Messages:  An Application of the 
Fishbein Model and Path Analysis, 7 J. ADVERTISING 28 (1979) (littering).
370
 Similarly, NIST provides the public with information on how to improve 
security.  See NIST Computer Security Publications at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/.
371
 Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Protection:  E-Commerce & the 
Internet, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menu-internet.htm (last modified 
Apr. 25, 2002).
372
 Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulators Launch Fake Scam Websites 
To Warn Investors About Fraud, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
scamsites.htm (last modified Jan. 30, 2002).
373 Id.
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products.  This program has led to substantial purchases of energy 
efficient products.374
One example of a proposed code-based government 
education campaign concerns the common security problem, which 
occurs when people do not update their computers and properly 
utilize code-based solutions such as firewalls and anti-virus software.  
To persuade people to use these tools, the government is preparing to 
develop an educational campaign directed at home and small 
business users.375  Another similar campaign could focus on limiting 
the use of social engineering.  This approach does not focus on the 
code, but instead gains information to bypass the security of 
computer users.376  Such an approach may involve tricking people 
into revealing passwords by pretending to be a technician.  The best 
countermeasure here is an education campaign, which would likely 
require social marketing techniques.377  However, it could result in 
fewer security problems with code.  Examples of basic security 
precautions that could be addressed include using strong passwords 
with a mixture of alphanumeric characters, changing passwords 
frequently, and educating employees about the risks of email 
attachments.378
IV. SHAPING CODE THROUGH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Government can use intellectual property rights, such as 
patents and copyright, to shape code.  In this first section, we note 
briefly that the government may modify intellectual property (IP)
rights to further innovation and preserve dissemination in code.  A 
detailed study of how the scope of IP rights can be modified in order 
to shape the development of code is a vast and important topic that is 
374
 Kevin Heslin, EPA’s Energy Star Program Pays Dividends, ENERGY USER 
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2001, available at http://www.energyusernews.com/CDA/
ArticleInformation/features/BNP__Features__Item/0,2584,19253,00.html.
375
 Brian Kerbs, U.S. Gov’t Plans Internet Security Ads, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 
2003.
376 KEVIN MITNICK, THE ART OF DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT 
OF SECURITY (2002).
377 See Malcolm Allen, The Use of Social Engineering as a Means of Violating 
Computer Systems, SANS Institute, available at http://rr.sans.org/social/
violating.php (Oct. 12, 2001); Rick Nelson, Methods of Hacking:  Social 
Engineering, available at http://www.isr.umd.edu/gemstone/infosec/ver2/ 
papers/socialeng.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2001).
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beyond the scope of this work.  In keeping this our brief foray into IP 
rights and the development of code, the second section focuses on 
the use of patent pools and compulsory licensing to foster the 
dissemination of code or content.  The third section focuses on the 
appropriate policy for transferring government created code to the 
private sector; this can have a significant impact on the development 
of code.
A.  Revising Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights differ from conventional property 
rights in one aspect: significant society benefits accrue from 
intellectual property that is not privatized.  Free flowing information 
allows people to build upon the intellectual efforts of others.  This is 
understood at the outset from Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 in the U.S. 
Constitution, which only permits limited protection for intellectual 
property rights in order to foster both creation and dissemination 
thereby promot[ing] “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."379
Thus, the government’s limited protection of intellectual property 
plays an important role in stimulating innovation, preserving 
dissemination and fostering cumulative innovation.380
Intellectual property rights for code have historically been 
different for hardware and software.  Patent law has traditionally 
protected the hardware components, and has recently joined 
copyright law in protecting software.  This change has occurred, not 
because of the actions of legislators, but because of judges.381
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, now allow the patenting of software.382
379 U.S. CONST. art.. I, § 8, cl. 8.
380
 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patents Standards:  Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803 (1988) (noting how the patent 
system should directly reward innovation).
381
 The Supreme Court played a role in changing intellectual property rights for 
biotechnology.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (allowing the 
patenting of genetically engineered life forms).
382
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding that a software related 
invention was patentable); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a computer software program 
that produces a useful result is patentable subject matter).  See also Julie E. Cohen 
& Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2001) (providing a brief history of software patents); 
Steven G. Steger, The Long and Winding Road to Greater Certainty in Software 
Patents, CBA RECORD, Apr. 2000, at 46 (providing a brief history of software 
patents); John T. Soma et al., Software Patents:  A U.S. and E.U. Comparison, 8 U. 
84
However, copyright protection of code has not decreased.  In fact, 
legislators have increased the duration of copyright protection with 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.383  This act 
retroactively extended the duration of copyrights an additional 
twenty years.384  Proponents argued that this extension would 
encourage investment in existing copyright works as well as 
encouraging the creation of new works, because of the longer 
exclusivity period.385
A number of scholars have argued that current intellectual 
property rights are too strong and actually discourage innovation.386
They believe that intellectual property laws need to facilitate the 
sharing of information to further innovation.  In keeping with this 
idea, Lessig proposes limiting the duration of copyright protection 
and requiring renewal every five years.387  If the copyright is not 
renewed, the work falls into the public domain.  He also proposes 
that, in order to gain copyright protection for software, the author 
must provide the source code so it may enter the public domain upon 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 5-29 (2000) (providing a history of software patents 
for the United States as well as European countries.  The paper describes how 
patent protection for software has changed over time).
383 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-304).
384
 This ensured that no new copyright works, such as Walt Disney’s Mickey 
Mouse character, would enter the public domain in the United States until 2019, 
when all works created in 1923 will enter into the public domain.  Christina N. 
Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 
385 (2000).  This legislation is currently being challenged in Eldred v. Reno, 537 
U.S. __ (2003).  See also Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within 
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
385
 Copyright Extension, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, available 
at http://www.copyrightextension.com/page01.html (last visited Jul. 16, 2002).  
Similarly, there have been calls for government to be allowed to copyright and 
grant partially exclusive and exclusive licenses for computer software by amending 
copyright law.  U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:  
CONSTRAINTS PERCEIVED BY FEDERAL LABORATORY AND AGENCY OFFICIALS 37 
(1988).
386 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND 
COPYWRONGS:  THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS 
CREATIVITY (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
387 LESSIG, supra note 386, at 251. See also Mark A. Haynes, Black Holes of 
Innovation in the Software Arts, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503 (1999) (arguing for 
limiting copyright protection, because it is slowing down innovation in code).
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expiration of the copyright.388  The net effect would be to place more 
content and code into the public domain for other to build on.
Evaluating and justifying the revision of intellectual property 
rights is difficult for two main reasons.  First, it is difficult to 
empirically ascertain whether intellectual property protection is too 
strong or too weak.  Concepts such as innovation or a public 
commons for knowledge are difficult to compare as to their costs and 
benefits.  Second, the modification of intellectual property rights 
affects a fundamental social and economic characteristic of 
society.389  Individuals and firms rely on these notions and 
definitions of property in their actions.  Therefore, any change 
undermines these assumptions.390  Nevertheless, for political 
economy reasons, the long-term trend in copyright law toward more 
protection has not slowed down.391
 B.  Patent Pools and Compulsory Licensing
A second, more tangible and immediate method of shaping 
code is by using patent pools and compulsory licensing, which 
allows the government to force a party to license their copyright or 
patent.  As a result, another party or the government can make, use, 
and sell the affected content or technology.  This allows government 
to expand the dissemination of intellectual property.  In the United 
States, the government has required compulsory licensing of 
388
 Lemley and O’Brien put forth another example of property rights affecting 
innovation.  They argue that the existing model of copyright law discourages the 
use of modular components in code.  Current copyright law favors new developers 
recreating portions of code, rather than copying the code for incorporation.  They 
believe that the principles of patent law, which encourage incorporation rather than 
recreation, may allow for greater use of modularity in code.  Mark A. Lemley & 
David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1997).
389
 Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:  Themes and Variations in 
American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV 1. 
 (noting the traditional justifications for the stability of property).
390
 We reject the argument that copyright terms are meaningless.  For example, 
Adkinson has argued that lengthening the terms of copyright is “unlikely to 
interfere with creativity or confer power over consumers. Recall that copyrighted 
works are not monopolies in the antitrust sense—they lack monopoly power—and 
the ideas contained in them are in the public domain from the outset.”  William F. 
Adkinson, Creativity & Control Part 2, AM. SPECTATOR, May 2002, available at 
http://www.gilder.com/AmericanSpectatorArticles/AdkinsonMay-June.htm.
391 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (noting the trend toward more 
protection).
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copyrights, but generally not patents.392  The prevailing justifications 
for the use of patent pools and/or compulsory licensing are high 
transactions costs, public interest, and the need to continue to 
promote downstream innovation.  These types of licensing schemes 
are used to reduce transactions costs.393  In some industries, there are 
large numbers of intellectual property rights holders that must be 
contracted with to develop or use their property rights.  These large 
numbers result in high transaction costs and reduce the incentive to 
use intellectual property.  
Government intervention seeks to address high transaction 
costs by using patent pools or compulsory licensing, which reduces 
the costs of haggling over individual transactions as well as 
providing an administrative method to ensure the proper parties are 
compensated.  For instance, the government requires compulsory 
licensing of the retransmission of broadcast signals by cable.  The 
rationale is that transaction costs would make it impractical for the 
cable company to pay royalties to each individual copyright owner of 
a broadcast signal.394  Through compulsory licensing, the 
government reduces the transaction costs for all parties and promotes 
the growth of new technology by ensuring an adequate supply of 
content.395  The objection to using compulsory licensing rests largely 
on the costs of government action as compared with private action.  
Opponents of government mandated compulsory licensing prefer 
privately established organizations that lower transactions costs, such 
392
 The 1976 Copyright Act provides for a number of compulsory licenses, such as 
for cable television, jukeboxes, and for public radio and public television. See 17 
U.S.C. 111, 116, 118.  Patents can also be the subject of compulsory licensing.  See 
Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (discussing the use of compulsory licensing for 
patents); Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents 
Under CERCLA, 9 J. NAT’L RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 397 (reviewing compulsory 
licensing of patents for cleanup of hazardous waste).  See also Consumer Project 
on Technology, Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the 
United States, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-cl.html (last 
visited July 22, 2002).
393
 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996) 
(noting how compulsory licensing can reduce transactions costs, but argues that 
privately established organizations are preferable to compulsory licensing). 
Darlene A. Cote, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner’s Rights:  Congress’ 
Continued Reliance on Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 230 
(noting that high transactions costs were a motivating factor in congressional 
action for compulsory licensing).
394
 Cote, supra note 393, at 228-232.
395 Id. at 242.
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as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(ASCAP).396  These groups argue that private organizations have 
more flexibility in their licensing decisions.397  Additionally, 
government action is subject to interested parties that may 
manipulate the rules for their own benefits.398
The existence of technology vital to the public interest, 
examples of which include public safety, national defense, 
agriculture, environment, and antitrust, is the second rationale for 
compulsory licensing.399  The justification for compulsory licensing 
is that the public interests are so great as to make it necessary to 
ensure public access to the products through compulsory licensing.  
A classic example is a life-saving drug that is sold at a high price.400
A host country may choose to use compulsory licensing to bring 
down the price of a drug.  The objection to this approach is that a 
compulsory license leads to a loss of monopoly power, which is an 
essential condition for an intellectual property right, resulting in 
lower revenue for the producer.  More generally, the government’s 
use of this power will reduce a firm’s incentive to innovate.  
Consequently, if firms believe they will be subject to compulsory 
licensing for a product, they will not develop it.401  In effect, the 
overuse of this method could actually lead to fewer technologies that 
address various public interests.402
A final objection to compulsory licensing is its administrative 
costs.  The necessary legislative and regulatory proceedings can take 
time because government does not move quickly.  Conversely, in the 
area of code, technological development is rapid.  As a result, 
396
 Merges, supra note 393 (arguing that compulsory licensing is inferior to 
privately established collective rights organizations that address the problem of 
high transaction costs).
397 Id. at 1295.
398 Id.
399
 Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States:  An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 670 (1988); Yosik, supra 
note 392, at 1279-84.
400
 Tracy Collins, The Pharmaceutical Companies Versus Aids Victims:  A Classic 
Case of Bad Versus Good? A Look at the Struggle Between International 
Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Treatment, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & 
COM. 159 (2001).
401
 Fauver, supra note 399, at 676-77.
402 Id. at 670-71.  See also Theodore C. Bailey, Innovation and Access:  The Role 
of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 
2001 J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 210-14 (arguing that while compulsory licensing 
may reduce the level of innovation, the reduction may actually be the socially 
optimal level for research activity). 
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compulsory licensing may reduce the incentive for firms to develop 
new business models that touch upon public interests because of the 
risk that they may be subject to compulsory licensing.403
There are a number of possible uses for compulsory licensing 
for code.  For example, to reduce transactions costs and promote the 
growth of new digital music technologies, the government could 
require compulsory licensing of music in a digital format.404  The 
critical issue is whether government intervention is really needed 
because of the lack of private action in permitting transactions of 
digitally formatted music.  In addition, compulsory licensing could 
be used in a variety of ways for the public interest.  As an example, 
one potential remedy in the Microsoft antitrust trial was the licensing 
of Microsoft Windows.405  This licensing could be justified by the 
unique and important nature of the Windows operating system to 
society.  Proponents would have to show how this licensing would 
increase innovation in the software industry.  Yet another compelling 
reason for compulsory licensing, besides innovation and competition, 
would be for code that protects privacy, national security, or minors.  
In this case, a compulsory licensing scheme could be justified to 
ensure that the product was widely disseminated.  However, in using 
such a scheme, the government would have to consider the 
administrative costs as well as the potential adverse effects on 
innovation – if firms are not adequately compensated by such 
licensing schemes, they may avoid developing code that addresses 
societal concerns.
C. Transferring Intellectual Property to the Private Sector
The government is capable of creating very innovative code.  
However, government is generally not the ideal institution to provide 
technical support, maintenance, and further enhancement of code.  
403
 Adkinson, supra note 390. 
404 Lawrence Lessig:  The "Dinosaurs" Are Taking Over, BUS. WK., May 13, 2002, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_19/b3782610.
htm; Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-
Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming); William Fisher, 
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004).
405 James V. Grimaldi, States Want Microsoft to Auction Off Windows Coding,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
news/local/html98/micx_19990328.html.  See generally Consumer Project on 
Technology, Compulsory Licensing as Remedy to Anticompetitive Practices, 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-at.html (last visited July 22, 
2002).
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Instead, this activity is better accomplished by other institutions such 
as firms, consortia, or the open source movement.406  For very 
innovative code to become useful to society, it is often necessary to 
transfer it to the private sector.407  Consequently, there are a number 
of laws that require government and public universities to support the 
transfer of its technology to the private sector.  Additionally, federal 
agencies, such as the NSF, seek to have their sponsored research 
commercialized.408
To promote technology transfer, the government has enacted 
laws that allow for the transfer of intellectual property rights to the 
private sector.409  The first notable law was the Stevenson-Wylder 
Technology Innovation Act, which made technology transfer an 
integral activity for federal laboratories.410  This was followed by the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which today allows universities and firms to patent 
and license the results of government-sponsored research.411  These 
laws represented a shift from public ownership of government-
sponsored research toward private appropriation,412 and has meant 
406 See Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Incorporating Societal Concerns into 
Communication Technologies, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG., (2003), at 28 (noting 
the competencies of other social institutions).
407
 J.S. Metcalfe & L. Georghiou, Equilibrium and Evolutionary Foundations of 
Technology Policy, 22 SCI. TECH. & INDUS. REV. 75 (1998) (arguing that effective 
innovation is dependent upon knowledge transfers between universities and the 
private sector).  This is known as a systemic approach in the study of innovation 
systems.  See Jukka-Pekka Salmenkaita & Ahti A. Salo, Rationales for 
Government Intervention in the Commercialization of New Technologies, Systems 
Analysis Laboratory Research Report, Sep. 8, 2001.
408
 Rita R. Colwell, Director, National Science Foundation, Remarks Before the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on VA/HUD and Independent Agencies, May 
4, 2000, available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/congress/106/rc00504sapprop.htm
(“This example is really just the latest in a string of NSF successes. The underlying 
technology for nearly all major search engines found on the web today - including 
Lycos, Excite, Infoseek, Inktomi and specialized search engines like Congress's 
own THOMAS - all were begun [and] created through NSF-funded research at 
universities.”)
409
 Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard R. Nelson, The Emergence and Standardization 
of University Technology Transfer Offices:  A Case Study of Institutional Change, 
ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. (forthcoming) (providing a history of university 
patent policy).
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 Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 
Stat. 2311-2320 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (1994)).
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 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 200-12 (1994).
412 See Rebecca Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:  Patents 
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 
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that inventions, previously in the public domain for anyone to use, 
may now be patented with arguably limited use.413
The standard justification for technology transfer laws is 
promoting commercialization.  These laws provide firms with the 
necessary intellectual property protection to support the eventual 
commercial development of a technology.  Firms argue that 
technologies developed by the public sector or government are 
immature and in need of further refining and testing before entering 
the marketplace.  However, such further development is risky.  
Therefore, firms need the protection of intellectual property rights 
through technology transfer laws which encourage them to accept 
risk in the development process.414  Without intellectual property 
protection, firms argue that government-sponsored technologies 
would languish in the public domain in their unrefined form.
The history of the NCSA Mosaic web server and web 
browser highlighted two different approaches the government could 
take in transferring its technology.  In one instance, the government 
licensed the technology to the private sector, and in the other 
instance, the government placed the technology in the public domain.  
In the case of the NCSA Mosaic web browser, the University of 
Illinois licensed out the code for several million dollars.415  The 
dominant web browser today, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, is built 
upon the NCSA Mosaic web browser source code.416  The second 
method of technology transfer consisted of placing the NCSA 
Mosaic web server into the public domain.  This method earned the 
university zero dollars.  However, the most popular web server 
today, Apache, available for free to the public, had its origins in the 
NCSA Mosaic web server source code.417
The Apache example challenges the prevailing view that 
intellectual property protection is needed to encourage the 




 Rebecca Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:  Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 
1669 (1996); U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 385, at 14.
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 University of Illinois, Research & Technology Management Office, Fiscal Year 
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commercialization of government-sponsored research.418  By placing 
the NCSA Mosaic web server into the public domain, the 
government encouraged the dissemination and continued innovation 
of the web server.  From this, individuals and firms incrementally 
and cumulatively improved the original source code created by 
NCSA.  On the whole, generalizing and passing on the efficacy of 
placing all government-sponsored innovations in the public domain 
is unsupported by our two case studies.  However, it is clear that 
definitive conclusions, either for or against intellectual property 
protection for government-sponsored research, are not currently 
possible.  Moreover, there is limited empirical evidence on this 
subject.419  It is clear which scenario benefits the University of 
Illinois.  However, it is not as clear which scenario benefits 
society.420  Perhaps society would have been better off if the NCSA 
Mosaic web browser was placed into the public domain instead of 
being licensed.421  This could have encouraged a larger number of 
entities to build upon the NCSA Mosaic web browser.
418 See Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get Into Practice, 48 MGMT. 
SCI. 61 (2001) (arguing on the basis of case studies that firms do not need the 
assurance of intellectual property protection to commercialize university 
technology).  
419
 David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S 
Universities:  An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. 
POL'Y 99, 117-18 (2001) (noting the lack of empirical evidence, but worried that 
the emphasis on patenting and licensing could hamper technological innovation, 
because it limits researchers access to technologies used in the process of 
conducting research); Sampat & Nelson, supra note 409 (commenting on the lack 
of evidence on the social benefits of existing technology transfer policy).
420 See Eisenberg, supra note 412, at 1712 (arguing that intellectual property 
protection by universities is more likely to retard product development than 
promote development).  
421 There is evidence that the primary outcome technology managers and university 
administrators are interested in are revenues.  While licensing revenues are easily 
quantifiable and a measure of success, they are not necessarily equivalent with the 
public interest.  Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: 
The Tale of University Licensing, NBER Working Paper 7 (1998) (conducting a 
survey of technology managers and university administrators on licensing).  The 
public interest is to ensure that technologies are transferred to the private sector.  In 
this manner other methods are just as important.  These methods include 
publication, conferences, informal information channels, and consulting.  
Similarly, a report for the National Institute of Health pointed out that a 
university’s principal obligation should not be maximization of revenues but the 
utilization of technologies, “technology transfer need not be a revenue source to be 
successful.”  Report of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group, 
Research Tools, June 4, 1998, available at http://www.nih.gov/
news/researchtools/index.htm.
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The Apache case study also challenges the assumption that 
firms are the only entity capable of commercializing code.  The 
prevailing logic for technology transfer laws assumes that only firms 
are capable of turning government sponsored research into useful 
products.  However, there is another institution that is capable of 
producing useful code, the open source movement.  The open source 
movement’s reliance on both individual volunteers as well as firms 
to develop useful code has been validated in many projects including 
Apache.  These products are not niche products, but rather products 
around which the computing industry is increasingly being based.  
Accordingly, the government’s efforts at technology transfer must 
recognize the value and strength of the open source movement.  To 
further innovation and dissemination of code, the government should 
ensure the open source movement has access to government-
sponsored code.  We propose, as a general rule, that government 
funded research should place its code in the public domain.422
Placing code in the public domain is the least restrictive method for 
both preserving access while permitting downstream intellectual 
property protection.423  This allows both firms and the open source 
movement to build upon the government's code.  Moreover, firms 
can still seek intellectual property protection for any code that they 
have spent effort on improving or refining.424  This policy is 
422
 Our proposal focuses on the public domain, because it is much less restrictive 
than the GPL.  The GPL requires any derivative code to be licensed under the 
GPL.  While some people don't want their work privatized, this is largely a 
personal decision.  Government should focus on creating the building blocks of 
code, no matter who the end users are.  See Evans & Reddy, supra note 317
(arguing that the government should favor the public domain or BSD style of 
licenses over the GPL.  Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License, 
available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last modified June 1991); 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 241 (discussing social, economic, and legal implication of open source 
software and the GPL); Richard Stallman, President, Free Software Foundation, 
Letter to the Editor:  Public Money, Private Code, SALON, Jan. 29, 2002, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/letters/2002/01/29/stallman_on_universities/index.html
(providing practical advice for university researchers on getting university code 
released with the GPL). 
423
 To ensure that government places code into the public domain it may be 
necessary to amend portions of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act.  An exception to government’s encouragement and support of 
intellectual property rights during technology transfer would be needed for 
software.
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consistent with technology transfer laws, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, 
which seeks to further the utilization of government-sponsored 
research.425  The main objection to this proposal is that all parties are 
treated equally, including foreign competitors to American 
companies.
One use of intellectual property protection during technology 
transfer is allowing the government to provide preferential treatment 
to American firms.  This is one of the many stated rationales for the 
Bayh-Dole Act.426  In response, we argue that preferential treatment 
is just one of the many underlying rationales for technology transfer.  
The main rationale behind technology transfer is ensuring the 
utilization of government research.  Moreover, the rise of the open 
source movement, which is based upon volunteers around the world, 
complicates any preferential treatment for American firms.  As an 
example, the development of Apache relied on developers from 
around the world.427  The effect of preferential treatment toward 
American firms is to ensure code is not available to the open source 
movement.  For example, American software firms have criticized 
the National Security Agency (NSA) for developing an enhanced 
secure version of the open source operating system Linux. 428
Nevertheless, NSA has decided to continue working on its secure 
version of Linux as part of its mission to understand and improve 
425
 35 U.S.C. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent 
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported 
research or development”).  See also Report of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) Working Group on Research Tools, June 4, 1998, available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm (noting that technology transfer 
is not about financial returns to the government from licensing).
426
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business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to promote 
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including 
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small 
business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise; to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the 
United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government 
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 Roy T. Fielding, Shared Leadership in the Apache Project, COMM. ACM, Apr. 
1999, at 42.
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2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-950083.html.
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computer security.429  The open source community has applauded the 
NSA’s work and has begun utilizing their code. 430
The policy of placing code into the public domain may be 
difficult for universities to pursue because licensing brings 
universities much needed revenue.  Therefore, it is difficult to turn 
away that money, and instead, place code into the public domain.  In 
fact, the University of Illinois had a number of companies seeking to 
license the NCSA Mosaic web browser.  Abandoning that potential 
licensing opportunity would go against the nature and mission of a 
university technology transfer office.  Thus, for this policy to become 
widely used, it will be necessary to change the mindset in technology 
transfer offices.431  Currently, universities are not “distinguishing 
between times when it’s important to have a patent in place to get 
something disseminated and times when it’s not.  They’re just 
looking to see if they can make money,” according to Eisenberg.432
As the NCSA Mosaic web server example shows, the benefits of 
placing code into the public domain may not flow directly to the 
429
 Drew Clark, Defense, NSA Move on ‘Open Source’ Software Development, 
GOV’T EXECUTIVE MAG., Mar. 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0303/031703td2.htm.
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TECH, Dec. 3, 2001, available at http://www.govtech.net/news/
news.phtml?docid=2001.12.03-3030000000003951.  See also Robert Lemos, U.S. 
Helps Fund FreeBSD Security Project, CNET NEWS.COM, July 9, 2001, available 
at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-269644.html (discussing the U.S. Department 
of Defense’s work on improving the security of FreeBSD, an open source variant 
of Unix).
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There are a few cases where is appears that technology transfer offices are placing 
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university, and it may take a long time for the benefits to accrue to 
society.433
Already, the government is slowly beginning to support the 
open source movement as an institution capable of developing code.  
While the open source movement has developed a significant amount 
of the code for the Internet, it also is playing a role in 
biotechnology.434  This has led the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
to begin studying the appropriate level of intellectual property 
protection needed for its research tools.  One such research tool is 
bioinformatics code.  A working group of the NIH has recommended 
that the NIH should promote the free distribution of research tools.435
Other researchers have been more aggressive in calling for the use of 
open source code.436
IV.  CONCLUSION
This Article has taken a very different approach than 
traditional scholarship which focuses on how code affects a 
particular societal concern.  Our goal was to show the many methods 
available to government to influence the development of code.  To 
this end, we analyzed a number of different regulatory and fiscal 
actions government can take to shape code. For each possible action, 
we discussed potential regulatory and technological issues that could 
affect the success of the action.  We believe our analysis will be 
invaluable to scholars and policymakers seeking to shape the 
development of code.
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In considering regulatory actions we noted that prohibitions 
can be an effective method of regulation, but current export 
prohibitions on encryption code are impractical.437  Similarly, we 
discussed the regulatory trade-offs with technology-forcing 
regulation and illustrated this by analyzing the CDA as a technology-
forcing regulation.438  Our analysis led us to criticize the current 
policy of mandating digital broadcasting technologies, because of 
their vague benefits.439  Our discussion of liability led us to conclude 
that modification of liability systems can result in more secure and 
safer code.440  However, we identified flaws in a proposed 
government policy to create a more secure code by attempting to 
develop an insurance system for cybersecurity.441  A final key point 
was the need for a comprehensive regulatory strategy for code.  Just 
as other regulatory objects, such as biotechnology and automobiles, 
have a regulatory framework, the same approach is needed for 
code.442
Our consideration of government’s fiscal approaches led us to 
offer a number of policy recommendations.  We discussed how 
government can shape code by funding its research and 
development.443  We also suggest that government should use its 
procurement power to favor open standards and open source code.444
Such a policy is consistent with the government’s goals of spending 
its resources efficiently while considering social and environmental 
externalities.  Finally, we argue that government can further 
innovation by promoting technology transfer by placing its code into 
the public domain.445  This allows a wide variety of parties to build 
upon and refine the work accomplished by government on the behalf 
of its citizens.
Future scholarship will more fully examine each of the 
measures discussed in this article.  We encourage and look forward 
to this, because it is our belief that code can serve as a beneficial 
regulatory mechanism.  To this end, we have attempted to analyze 
the various methods that policymakers may use to guide and promote 
the development of code that contributes to our society.
437 See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
438 See supra Part II.B.1.
439 See supra text accompanying note 94.
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442 See supra Part II.F.
443 See supra Part III.A.1.
444 See supra Part III.B.
445 See supra Part IV.C.
